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1. Frederic S. Mishkin
Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in
Emerging Market Countries
2.1.1 Introduction
In recent years, ﬁnancial crises have been a common occurrence in
emerging market (and transition) countries, with devastating consequences
for their economies. For example, the ﬁnancial crises that struck Mexico in
1994 and the East Asian countries in 1997 led to a fall in the growth rate of
gross domestic product (GDP) on the order of ten percentage points. The
ﬁnancial crises in Russia in 1998 and Ecuador in 1999 have had similar neg-
ative eﬀects on real output. These crises led not only to sharp increases in
poverty, but to political instability as well.
Given the harmful eﬀects and increased frequency of ﬁnancial crises in
emerging market countries in recent years, an issue that is now high on the
agenda of policymakers throughout the world is the prevention of these
crises. Speciﬁcally, what ﬁnancial policies can help make crises less likely?
This paper examines this question by ﬁrst developing a framework for
understanding what a ﬁnancial crisis is in emerging market countries and
the dynamic process through which these crises occur. It then uses this
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4. Montek S. Ahluwaliaframework to examine what particular ﬁnancial policies may help to pre-
vent ﬁnancial crises.
2.1.2 What is a Financial Crisis?
A ﬁnancial system performs the essential function of channeling funds to
those individuals or ﬁrms that have productive investment opportunities.
To do this well, participants in ﬁnancial markets must be able to make ac-
curate judgments about which investment opportunities are more or less
creditworthy. Thus, a ﬁnancial system must confront problems of asym-
metric information, in which one party to a ﬁnancial contract has much less
accurate information than the other party. For example, borrowers who
take out loans usually have better information about the potential returns
and risk associated with the investment projects they plan to undertake
than lenders do. Asymmetric information leads to two basic problems in the
ﬁnancial system (and elsewhere): adverse selection and moral hazard.
Adverse selection occurs before the ﬁnancial transaction takes place,
when potential bad credit risks are the ones who most actively seek out a
loan. For example, those who want to take on big risks are likely to be the
most eager to take out a loan, even at a high rate of interest, because they
are less concerned with paying the loan back. Thus, the lender must be con-
cerned that the parties who are the most likely to produce an undesirable or
adverse outcome are most likely to be selected as borrowers. Lenders may
thus steer away from making loans at high interest rates because they know
that they are not fully informed about the quality of borrowers, and they
fear that someone willing to borrow at a high interest rate is more likely to
be a low-quality borrower who is less likely to repay the loan. Lenders will
try to tackle the problem of asymmetric information by screening out good
from bad credit risks. However, this process is inevitably imperfect, and fear
of adverse selection will lead lenders to reduce the quantity of loans they
might otherwise make.
Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place. It occurs because
a borrower has incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the
borrower does well if the project succeeds, but the lender bears most of the
loss if the project fails. A borrower also has incentives to misallocate funds
for personal use, to shirk and not work very hard, and to undertake invest-
ment in unproﬁtable projects that serve only to increase personal power or
stature. Thus, a lender is subjected to the hazard that the borrower has in-
centives to engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point
of view: that is, activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid
back. Lenders do often impose restrictions (restrictive covenants) on bor-
rowers so that borrowers do not engage in behavior that makes it less likely
that they can pay back the loan. However, such restrictions are costly to en-
force and monitor and inevitably somewhat limited in their reach. The po-
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moral hazard again implies that many lenders will lend less than they oth-
erwise would, so that lending and investment will be at suboptimal levels.
The asymmetric information problems described above provide a deﬁni-
tion of what a ﬁnancial crisis is:
A ﬁnancial crisis is a disruption to ﬁnancial markets in which adverse se-
lection and moral hazard problems become much worse, so that ﬁnancial
markets are unable to channel funds eﬃciently to those who have the
most productive investment opportunities.
A ﬁnancial crisis thus results in the inability of ﬁnancial markets to function
eﬃciently, which leads to a sharp contraction in economic activity.
2.1.3 Factors Promoting Financial Crises
To ﬂesh out how a ﬁnancial crisis comes about and causes a decline in
economic activity, we need to examine the factors that promote ﬁnancial
crises and then go on to look at how these factors interact dynamically to
produce ﬁnancial crises.
There are four types of factors that can lead to increases in asymmetric
information problems and thus to a ﬁnancial crisis: (a) deterioration of ﬁ-
nancial-sector balance sheets, (b) increases in interest rates, (c) increases in
uncertainty, and (d) deterioration of nonﬁnancial balance sheets due to
changes in asset prices.
Deterioration of Financial-Sector Balance Sheets
The literature on asymmetric information and ﬁnancial structure (see
Gertler 1988 and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1998 for excellent sur-
veys), explains why ﬁnancial intermediaries (commercial banks, thrift insti-
tutions, ﬁnance companies, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pen-
sion funds) play such an important role in the ﬁnancial system. They have
both the ability and the economic incentive to address asymmetric infor-
mation problems. For example, banks have an obvious ability to collect in-
formation at the time they consider making a loan, and this ability is only
increased when banks engage in long-term customer relationships and line-
of-credit arrangements. In addition, their ability to scrutinize the checking
account balances of their borrowers provides banks with an additional ad-
vantage in monitoring the borrowers’ behavior. Banks also have advantages
in reducing moral hazard because, as demonstrated by Diamond (1984),
they can engage in lower-cost monitoring than individuals, and because, as
pointed out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), they have advantages in prevent-
ing risk-taking by borrowers since they can use the threat of cutting oﬀ
lending in the future to improve a borrower’s behavior. Banks’ natural ad-
vantages in collecting information and reducing moral hazard explain why
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world. Indeed, the greater diﬃculty of acquiring information on private
ﬁrms in emerging market countries explains why banks play a more impor-
tant role in the ﬁnancial systems in emerging market countries than they do
in industrialized countries (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1994).
Banks (and other ﬁnancial intermediaries) have an incentive to collect
and produce such information because they make private loans that are not
traded, which reduces free-rider problems. In markets for other securities,
like stocks, if some investors acquire information that screens out which
stocks are undervalued and then they buy these securities, other investors
who have not paid to discover this information may be able to buy right
along with the well-informed investors. If enough free-riding investors can
do this and the price is bid up, then investors who have collected informa-
tion will earn less on the securities they purchase and will thus have less in-
centive to collect this information. Once investors recognize that other in-
vestors in securities can monitor and enforce restrictive covenants, they will
also want to free-ride on the other investors’ monitoring and enforcement.
As a result, not enough resources will be devoted to screening, monitoring,
and enforcement. However, because the loans of banks are private, other
investors cannot buy the loans directly, and free-riding on banks’ restrictive
covenants is much trickier than simply following the buying patterns of oth-
ers. As a result, investors are less able to free-ride oﬀof ﬁnancial institutions
making private loans like banks, and since banks receive the beneﬁts of
screening and monitoring they have an incentive to carry it out.
The special importance of banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries in
the ﬁnancial system implies that if their ability to lend is impaired, overall
lending will decline and the economy will contract. A deterioration in the
balance sheets of ﬁnancial intermediaries indeed hinders their ability to
lend and is thus a key factor promoting ﬁnancial crises.
If banks (and other ﬁnancial intermediaries making loans) suﬀer a dete-
rioration in their balance sheets, and so have a substantial contraction in
their capital, they have two choices: either they can cut back on their lend-
ing, or they can try to raise new capital. However, when these institutions
experience a deterioration in their balance sheets, it is very hard for them to
raise new capital at a reasonable cost. Thus, the typical response of ﬁnan-
cial institutions with weakened balance sheets is a contraction in their lend-
ing, which slows economic activity. Recent research suggests that weak bal-
ance sheets led to a capital crunch that hindered growth in the U.S. economy
during the early 1990s (e.g., see Bernanke and Lown 1991; Berger and Udell
1994; Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995; Peek and Rosengren 1995; and the
symposium published in Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1993).
If the deterioration in bank balance sheets is severe enough, it can even
lead to bank panics, in which there are multiple, simultaneous failures of
banking institutions. Indeed, in the absence of a government safety net,
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other, causing even healthy banks to fail. The source of the contagion is
again asymmetric information. In a panic, depositors, fearing the safety of
their deposits and not knowing the quality of the banks’ loan portfolios,
withdraw their deposits from the banking system, causing a contraction in
loans and a multiple contraction in deposits, which then causes other banks
to fail. In turn, the failure of a bank means the loss of the information rela-
tionships in which that bank participated, and thus a direct loss in the
amount of ﬁnancial intermediation that can be done by the banking sector.
The outcome is an even sharper decline in lending to facilitate productive
investments, with an additional resulting contraction in economic activity.
Increases in Interest Rates
Asymmetric information and the resulting adverse selection problem can
lead to “credit rationing,” in which some borrowers are denied loans even
when they are willing to pay a higher interest rate (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
This occurs because as interest rates rise, prudent borrowers are more likely
to decide that it would be unwise to borrow, whereas borrowers with the
riskiest investment projects are often those who are willing to pay the high-
est interest rates, since if the high-risk investment succeeds, they will be the
main beneﬁciaries. In this setting, a higher interest rate leads to even greater
adverse selection; that is, the higher interest rate increases the likelihood
that the lender is lending to a bad credit risk. Thus, higher interest rates can
be one factor that helps precipitate ﬁnancial instability, because lenders rec-
ognize that higher interest rates mean a dilution in the quality of potential
borrowers, and lenders are likely to react by taking a step back from their
business of ﬁnancial intermediation and limiting the number of loans they
make.
Increases in interest rates can also have a negative eﬀect on bank balance
sheets. The traditional banking business involves “borrowing short and
lending long”; that is, taking deposits that can be withdrawn on demand (or
certiﬁcates of deposit that can be withdrawn in a matter of months) and
making loans that will be repaid over periods of years or sometimes even
decades. In short, the assets of a bank typically have longer duration than
its liabilities. Thus, a rise in interest rates directly causes a decline in net
worth, because in present value terms, the interest rate rise lowers the value
of assets, with their longer duration, more than it raises the value of liabili-
ties, with their shorter duration.
Increases in Uncertainty
A dramatic increase in uncertainty in ﬁnancial markets makes it harder
for lenders to screen out good credit risks from bad. The lessened ability of
lenders to solve adverse selection and moral hazard problems renders them
less willing to lend, leading to a decline in lending, investment, and aggre-
Financial Policies 97gate activity. This increase in uncertainty can stem from a failure of a promi-
nent ﬁnancial or nonﬁnancial institution or from a recession, but, of even
more importance in emerging market countries, it can result from uncer-
tainty about the future direction of government policies.
Deterioration of Nonﬁnancial Balance Sheets
The state of the balance sheet of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms is the most critical
factor for the severity of asymmetric information problems in the ﬁnancial
system. If there is a widespread deterioration of balance sheets among bor-
rowers, it worsens both adverse selection and moral hazard problems in ﬁ-
nancial markets, thus promoting ﬁnancial instability. This problem can
arise in a variety of ways.
For example, lenders often use collateral as an important way of ad-
dressing asymmetric information problems. Collateral reduces the conse-
quences of adverse selection or moral hazard because it reduces the lender’s
losses in the case of a default. If a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender
can sell the collateral to make up for at least some of the losses on the loan.
However, if asset prices in an economy fall, and the value of collateral falls
as well, then the problems of asymmetric information suddenly become
more severe.
Net worth can perform a similar role to collateral. If a ﬁrm has high net
worth, then even if it defaults on its debt payments, the lender can take title
to the ﬁrm’s net worth, sell it oﬀ, and use the proceeds to recoup some of the
losses from the loan. High net worth also directly decreases the incentives
for borrowers to commit moral hazard, because borrowers now have more
at stake, and thus more to lose, if they default on their loans. The impor-
tance of net worth explains why stock market crashes can cause ﬁnancial in-
stability. A sharp decline in the stock market reduces the market valuation
of a ﬁrm’s net worth and thus can increase adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems in ﬁnancial markets (Bernanke and Gertler 1989; Calomiris
and Hubbard 1990). Because the stock market decline that reduces net
worth increases incentives for borrowers to engage in moral hazard, and be-
cause lenders are now less protected against the consequences of adverse se-
lection because the value of net assets is worth less, lending decreases and
economic activity declines.
Increases in interest rates not only have a direct eﬀect on increasing ad-
verse selection problems, as described earlier, but they may also promote ﬁ-
nancial instability through both ﬁrms’ and households’ balance sheets. A
rise in interest rates will increase households’ and ﬁrms’ interest payments,
decrease cash ﬂow, and thus cause a deterioration in their balance sheets, as
pointed out in Bernanke and Gertler’s (1995) excellent survey of the credit
view of monetary transmission. As a result, adverse selection and moral
hazard problems become more severe for potential lenders to these ﬁrms
and households, leading to a decline in lending and economic activity.
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be an important factor leading to ﬁnancial instability.
Unexpected changes in the rate of inﬂation can also aﬀect balance sheets
of borrowers. In economies in which inﬂation has been moderate for a long
period of time, debt contracts with long duration have interest payments
ﬁxed in nominal terms for a substantial period of time. When inﬂation turns
out to be less than anticipated, which can occur either because of an unan-
ticipated disinﬂation, as occurred in the United States in the early 1980s, or
by an outright deﬂation, as has occurred in Japan more recently, the value
of ﬁrms’ liabilities in real terms rises, and its net worth in real terms declines.
The reduction in net worth then increases the adverse selection and moral
hazard problems facing lenders and reduces investment and economic ac-
tivity.
In emerging market economies, a decline in unanticipated inﬂation does
not have the unfavorable direct eﬀect on ﬁrms’ balance sheets that it has in
industrialized countries. Debt contracts are of very short duration in many
emerging market countries, and because the terms of debt contracts are
continually repriced to reﬂect expectations of inﬂation, unexpected inﬂa-
tion has little real eﬀect. Thus, one mechanism that has played a role in in-
dustrialized countries to promote ﬁnancial instability has no role in many
emerging market countries.
On the other hand, emerging market economies face at least one factor
aﬀecting balance sheets that can be extremely important in precipitating ﬁ-
nancial instability that is not important in most industrialized countries:
unanticipated exchange rate depreciation or devaluation. Because of un-
certainty about the future value of the domestic currency, many nonﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms, banks, and governments in emerging market countries ﬁnd it
much easier to issue debt if the debt is denominated in foreign currencies.
With debt contracts denominated in foreign currency, when there is an
unanticipated depreciation or devaluation of the domestic currency, the
debt burden of domestic ﬁrms increases. Since assets are typically denomi-
nated in domestic currency and so do not increase in value, there is a re-
sulting decline in net worth. This deterioration in balance sheets then in-
creases adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which leads to
ﬁnancial instability and a sharp decline in investment and economic ac-
tivity.
2.1.4 Dynamics of Financial Crises
Financial crises in emerging markets undergo several stages. There is an
initial stage during which a deterioration in ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial bal-
ance sheets occurs and which promotes the second stage, a currency crisis.
The third stage is a further deterioration of ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial bal-
ance sheets that occurs as a result of the currency crisis, and this stage is the
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devastating consequences.
Initial Stage: Run-Up to the Currency Crisis
The ﬁrst stage leading up to a ﬁnancial crisis in emerging market coun-
tries has typically been a ﬁnancial liberalization, which involved lifting re-
strictions on both interest rate ceilings and the type of lending allowed and
often privatization of the ﬁnancial system. As a result, lending increased
dramatically, fed by inﬂows of international capital.
Of course, the problem was not that lending expanded, but rather that it
expanded so rapidly that excessive risk-taking was the result, which led to
an increase in nonperforming loans. For example, in Mexico and the East
Asian crisis countries, the estimated percentage of loans that were nonper-
forming increased to over 10 percent before the ﬁnancial crisis struck
(Mishkin 1996b; Goldstein 1998; and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 1998),
and these estimates were probably grossly understated. This excessive risk-
taking occurred for two reasons. First, banks and other ﬁnancial institu-
tions lacked the well-trained loan oﬃcers, risk-assessment systems, and
other management expertise to evaluate and respond to risk appropriately.
This problem was made even more severe by the rapid credit growth in a
lending boom, which stretched the resources of the bank supervisors, who
also failed to monitor these new loans appropriately. Second, emerging
market countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, the East Asian crisis countries,
and Russia were notorious for weak ﬁnancial regulation and supervision.
(In contrast, the noncrisis countries in East Asia—Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan—had very strong prudential supervision.) When ﬁnancial lib-
eralization yielded new opportunities to take on risk, these weak regula-
tory/supervisory systems could not limit the moral hazard created by the
government safety net, and excessive risk-taking was one result. Even as the
government failed in supervising ﬁnancial institutions, it was eﬀectively
oﬀering an implicit safety net that these institutions would not be allowed
to go broke, thus reassuring depositors and foreign lenders that they did not
need to monitor these institutions, since there were likely to be government
bailouts to protect them.
It is important to note that banks were not the only source of excessive
risk-taking in the ﬁnancial systems of crisis countries. In Thailand, ﬁnance
companies, which were essentially unregulated, were at the forefront of real
estate lending, and they were the ﬁrst to get into substantial diﬃculties be-
fore the 1997 crisis (Ito 1998). In Korea, merchant banks, which were pri-
marily owned by the chaebol (conglomerates) and were again virtually un-
regulated, expanded their lending far more rapidly than the commercial
banks and were extremely active in borrowing abroad in foreign currency
(Hahm and Mishkin 2000). Banks in these countries also expanded their
lending and engaged in excessive risk-taking as a result of ﬁnancial liberal-
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more scrutiny did put some restraints on their behavior.
A dangerous dynamic emerged. Once ﬁnancial liberalization was
adopted, foreign capital ﬂew into banks and other ﬁnancial intermediaries
in these emerging market countries because they paid high yields in order
to attract funds to rapidly increase their lending, and because such invest-
ments were viewed as likely to be protected by a government safety net, ei-
ther from the government of the emerging market country or from inter-
national agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The
capital inﬂow problem was further stimulated by government policies of
keeping exchange rates pegged to the dollar, which probably gave foreign in-
vestors a sense of lower risk. In Mexico and East Asia, capital inﬂows aver-
aged over 5 percent of GDP in the three years leading up to the crises. The
private capital inﬂows led to increases in the banking sector, especially in
the emerging market countries in the Asia-Paciﬁc region (Folkerts-Landau
et al. 1995). The capital inﬂows fueled a lending boom, which led to exces-
sive risk-taking on the part of banks, which in turn led to huge loan losses
and a subsequent deterioration of banks’ and other ﬁnancial institutions’
balance sheets.
The inﬂow of foreign capital, particularly short-term capital, was often
actively encouraged by governments. For example, the Korean government
allowed chaebol to convert ﬁnance companies they owned into merchant
banks, which were allowed to borrow freely abroad as long as the debt was
short-term. A similar phenomenon occurred in Thailand, which allowed ﬁ-
nance companies to borrow from foreigners. The result was substantial in-
creases in foreign indebtedness relative to the country’s holding of interna-
tional reserves: Mexico, Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia all ended up with
ratios of short-term foreign debt relative to reserves exceeding 1.5. The high
degree of illiquidity in these countries suggests that they were vulnerable to
a ﬁnancial crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998).
This deterioration in ﬁnancial-sector balance sheets, by itself, might have
been suﬃcient to drive these countries into ﬁnancial and economic crises.
As explained earlier, a deterioration in the balance sheets of ﬁnancial ﬁrms
can lead them, at a minimum, to restrict their lending or can even lead to a
full-scale banking crisis, which forces many banks into insolvency, thereby
nearly removing the ability of the banking sector to make loans. The re-
sulting credit crunch can stagger an economy.
Another consequence of ﬁnancial liberalization was a huge increase in
leverage in the corporate sector. For example, in Korea, debt relative to eq-
uity for the corporate sector as a whole shot up to 350 percent before the cri-
sis, and it was over 400 percent for the chaebol. The increase in corporate
leverage was also very dramatic in Indonesia, where corporations often bor-
rowed directly abroad by issuing bonds, rather than borrowing from banks.
This increase in corporate leverage increased the vulnerability to a ﬁnancial
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rations into ﬁnancial distress.
Stock market declines and increases in uncertainty were additional fac-
tors precipitating the full-blown crises in Mexico, Thailand, and South Ko-
rea. (The stock market declines in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
occurred simultaneously with the onset of the crisis.) The Mexican econ-
omy was hit by political shocks in 1994 that created uncertainty, speciﬁcally
the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the ruling party’s presidential
candidate, and an uprising in the southern state of Chiapas. By the middle
of December 1994, stock prices on the Bolsa (stock exchange) had fallen
nearly 20 percent from their September 1994 peak. In January 1997, a ma-
jor Korean chaebol, Hanbo Steel, collapsed; it was the ﬁrst bankruptcy of a
chaebol in a decade. Shortly thereafter, Sammi Steel and Kia Motors also
declared bankruptcy. In Thailand, Samprosong Land, a major real estate
developer, defaulted on its foreign debt in early February 1997, and ﬁnan-
cial institutions that had lent heavily in the real estate market began to en-
counter serious diﬃculties, requiring over $8 billion of loans from the Thai
central bank to prop them up. Finally, in June, the failure of a major Thai
ﬁnance company, Finance One, imposed substantial losses on both domes-
tic and foreign creditors. These events increased general uncertainty in the
ﬁnancial markets of Thailand and South Korea, and both experienced sub-
stantial declines in their securities markets. From peak values in early 1996,
Korean stock prices fell by 25 percent and Thai stock prices fell by 50 per-
cent.
As we have seen, an increase in uncertainty and a decrease in net worth
as a result of a stock market decline increases asymmetric information
problems. It became harder to screen out good from bad borrowers, and the
decline in net worth decreased the value of ﬁrms’ collateral and increased
their incentives to make risky investments, because there is less equity to
lose if the investments are unsuccessful. The increase in uncertainty and
stock market declines that occurred before the crisis, along with the deteri-
oration in banks’ balance sheets, worsened adverse selection and moral
hazard problems and made the economies ripe for a serious ﬁnancial crisis.
Second Stage: Currency Crisis
The deterioration of ﬁnancial- and nonﬁnancial-sector balance sheets is
a key factor leading to the second stage, a currency crisis. A weak banking
system makes it less likely that the central bank will take the steps to defend
a domestic currency, because if it raises rates, bank balance sheets are likely
to deteriorate further. In addition, raising rates sharply increases the cost of
ﬁnancing for highly leveraged corporations, which typically borrow short-
term, making them more likely to experience ﬁnancial distress. Once in-
vestors recognize that a central bank is less likely to take the steps to suc-
cessfully defend its currency, expected proﬁts from selling the currency will
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tion that the ﬁnancial sector may collapse and require a bailout that would
produce substantial ﬁscal deﬁcits in the future also makes it more likely that
the currency will depreciate (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 1998).
The weakened state of the ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial balance sheets,
along with the high degree of illiquidity in Mexico and East Asian countries
before the crisis, then set the stage for their currency crises. With these vul-
nerabilities, speculative attacks on the currency could have been triggered
by a variety of factors. In the Mexican case, the attacks came in the wake of
political instability in 1994, such as the assassination of political candidates
and an uprising in Chiapas. Even though the Mexican central bank inter-
vened in the foreign exchange market and raised interest rates sharply, it was
unable to stem the attack and was forced to devalue the peso on 20 Decem-
ber 1994. In Thailand, the attacks followed unsuccessful attempts of the
government to shore up the ﬁnancial system, culminating in the failure of
Finance One. Eventually, the inability of the central bank to defend the
currency because the required measures would do too much harm to the
weakened ﬁnancial sector meant that the attacks could not be resisted.
The outcome was therefore a collapse of the Thai baht in early July 1997.
Subsequent speculative attacks on other Asian currencies led to devalua-
tions and ﬂoats of the Philippine peso and Malaysian ringgit in mid-July,
the Indonesian rupiah in mid-August, and the Korean won in October. By
early 1998, the currencies of Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Ko-
rea had fallen by over 30 percent, with the Indonesian rupiah falling by over
75 percent.
Third Stage: Currency Crisis to Full-Fledged Financial Crisis
Once a full-blown speculative attack occurs and causes a currency de-
preciation, the institutional structure of debt markets in emerging market
countries—the short duration of debt contracts and their denomination in
foreign currencies—now interacts with the currency devaluation to propel
the economies into full-ﬂedged ﬁnancial crises. These features of debt con-
tracts generate three mechanisms through which the currency crises in-
crease asymmetric information problems in credit markets, thereby causing
a ﬁnancial crisis to occur.
The ﬁrst mechanism involves the direct eﬀect of currency devaluation on
the balance sheets of ﬁrms. As discussed earlier, the devaluations in Mexico
and East Asia increased the debt burden of domestic ﬁrms that were de-
nominated in foreign currencies. This mechanism was particularly strong in
Indonesia, the worst hit of all the crisis countries, which saw the value of its
currency decline by over 75 percent, thus increasing the rupiah value of for-
eign-denominated debts by a factor of four. Even a healthy ﬁrm is likely to
be driven into insolvency by such a shock if it had a signiﬁcant amount of
foreign-denominated debt.
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arises because the devaluation of the domestic currency led to further dete-
rioration in the balance sheets of the ﬁnancial sector, provoking a large-
scale banking crisis. In Mexico and the east Asian countries, banks and
many other ﬁnancial institutions had many liabilities denominated in for-
eign currency, which increase sharply in value when a depreciation occurs.
On the other hand, the problems of ﬁrms and households meant that they
were unable to pay oﬀ their debts, also resulting in loan losses on the asset
side of ﬁnancial institutions’ balance sheets. The result was that banks’ and
other ﬁnancial institutions’ balance sheets were squeezed from both the as-
sets and liabilities side. Moreover, many of these institutions’ foreign cur-
rency–denominated debt was very short-term, so that the sharp increase in
the value of this debt led to liquidity problems because this debt needed to
be paid back quickly. The result of the further deterioration in banks’ and
other ﬁnancial institutions’ balance sheets and their weakened capital base
is that they cut back lending. In the case of Indonesia, these forces were se-
vere enough to cause a banking panic in which numerous banks were forced
to go out of business.
The third mechanism linking currency crises with ﬁnancial crises in
emerging market countries is that the devaluation can lead to higher inﬂa-
tion. The central bank in an emerging market country may have little cred-
ibility as an inﬂation ﬁghter. Thus, a sharp depreciation of the currency af-
ter a speculative attack leads to immediate upward pressure on import
prices, which can lead to a dramatic rise in both actual and expected inﬂa-
tion. This is exactly what happened in Mexico and Indonesia, where inﬂa-
tion surged to over a 50 percent annual rate after the currency crisis. (Thai-
land, Malaysia, and South Korea avoided a large rise in inﬂation, which
partially explains their better performance relative to Indonesia.) The rise
in expected inﬂation after the currency crises in Mexico and Indonesia led
to a sharp rise in nominal interest rates, which, given the short duration of
debt, led to huge increases in interest payments by ﬁrms. The outcome was
a weakening of ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow position and a further weakening of their
balance sheets, which then increased adverse selection and moral hazard
problems in credit market.
All three of these mechanisms indicate that the currency crisis caused a
sharp deterioration in both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms’ balance sheets
in the crisis countries, which then translated to a contraction in lending and
a severe economic downturn. Financial markets were then no longer able to
channel funds to those with productive investment opportunities, which led
to devastating eﬀects on the economies of these countries.
Note that the 1999 Brazilian crisis was not a ﬁnancial crisis of the type
described here. Brazil experienced a classic balance-of-payments crisis of
the type described in Krugman (1979), in which concerns about unsustain-
able ﬁscal policy led to a currency crisis. The Brazilian banking system was
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reform after a banking crisis in 1994–96 (see Caprio and Klingbiel 1999).
Furthermore, Brazilian banks were adequately hedged against exchange
rate risk before the devaluation in 1999 (Adams, Mathieson, and Schinasi
1999). As a result, the devaluation did not trigger a ﬁnancial crisis, although
the high interest rates after the devaluation did lead to a recession. The fact
that Brazil did not experience a ﬁnancial crisis explains why Brazil fared so
much better after its devaluation than did Mexico or the East Asian crisis
countries.
Russia’s ﬁnancial crisis in 1998 also had a strong ﬁscal component but
was actually a symptom of widespread breakdown of structural reform and
institution-building eﬀorts (see IMF 1998). When the debt moratorium/re-
structuring and ruble devaluation were announced on 17 August, Russian
banks were subject to substantial losses on $27 billion face value of gov-
ernment securities and increased liabilities from their foreign debt. The col-
lapse of the banking system and the negative eﬀects on balance sheets on the
nonﬁnancial sector from the collapse of the ruble then led to a ﬁnancial cri-
sis along the lines outlined above.
2.1.5 Financial Policies to Prevent Financial Crises
Now that we have developed a framework for understanding why ﬁnan-
cial crises occur, we can look at what ﬁnancial policies can help prevent
these crises from occurring. We examine twelve basic areas of ﬁnancial re-
form: (a) prudential supervision, (b) accounting and disclosure require-
ments, (c) legal and judicial systems, (d) market-based discipline, (e) entry
of foreign banks, (f) capital controls, (g) reduction of the role of state-
owned ﬁnancial institutions, (h) restrictions on foreign-denominated debt,
(i) elimination of too-big-to-fail policies in the corporate sector, (j) se-
quencing ﬁnancial liberalization, (k) monetary policy and price stability,
and (l) exchange rate regimes and foreign exchange reserves.
Prudential Supervision
As we have seen, banks play a particularly important role in the ﬁnancial
systems of emerging market countries, and problems in the banking sector
have been an important factor promoting ﬁnancial crises in recent years.
Deterioration in banks’ balance sheets, which can lead to banking crises, in-
crease asymmetric information problems, which bring on ﬁnancial crises.
Furthermore, problems in the banking sector make a foreign exchange cri-
sis more likely, which, by harming nonﬁnancial balance sheets, leads to a
full-blown ﬁnancial crisis. Because banking panics have such potentially
harmful eﬀects, governments almost always provide an extensive safety net
for the banking system to prevent banking panics. The downside of the
safety net is that it increases moral hazard incentives for excessive risk-
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crises will occur. To prevent ﬁnancial crises, governments therefore need to
pay particular attention to creating and sustaining a strong bank regula-
tory/supervisory system to reduce excessive risk-taking in their ﬁnancial
systems.
Because the government safety net in emerging market countries has in-
variably been extended to other ﬁnancial intermediaries—for example, the
Thai central bank provided liquidity assistance to insolvent ﬁnance com-
panies—these other ﬁnancial institutions also have strong incentives to en-
gage in excessive risk-taking. Indeed, deterioration in the balance sheets of
these ﬁnancial institutions played an important role in the ﬁnancial crises in
East Asia. Eﬀective prudential supervision of these nonbank ﬁnancial in-
stitutions is also critical to promote ﬁnancial stability.
Encouraging a strong regulatory/supervisory system for the ﬁnancial
system takes seven basic forms.
Prompt Corrective Action
Quick action by prudential supervisors to stop undesirable activities by
ﬁnancial institutions and, even more importantly, to close down institu-
tions that do not have suﬃcient capital is critical if ﬁnancial crises are to be
avoided. Regulatory forbearance that leaves insolvent institutions operat-
ing is disastrous because it dramatically increases moral hazard incentives
to take on excessive risk, because an operating but insolvent institution has
almost nothing to lose by taking on colossal risks. If they get lucky and the
risky investments pay oﬀ, they get out of insolvency. On the other hand, if,
as is likely, the risky investments don’t pay oﬀ, insolvent institutions’ losses
will mount, weakening the ﬁnancial system further and leading to higher
taxpayer bailouts in the future. Indeed, this is exactly what occurred in the
savings and loan (S&L) industry in the United States when insolvent S&Ls
were allowed to operate during the 1980s and was a feature of the situation
in Mexico, East Asia, and Japan in the 1990s.
An important way to ensure that bank supervisors do not engage in reg-
ulatory forbearance is through implementation of prompt corrective action
provisions that require supervisors to intervene earlier and more vigorously
when a ﬁnancial institution gets into trouble. Prompt corrective action is
crucial to preventing problems in the ﬁnancial sector because it creates in-
centives for institutions not to take on too much risk in the ﬁrst place, know-
ing that if they do so, they are more likely to be punished.
The outstanding example of prompt corrective action is the provision in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
legislation implemented in the United States in 1991. Banks in the United
States are classiﬁed into ﬁve groups based on bank capital. Group 1, classi-
ﬁed as “well capitalized,” consists of banks that signiﬁcantly exceed mini-
mum capital requirements and are allowed privileges such as insurance on
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in group 2, classiﬁed as “adequately capitalized,” meet minimum capital re-
quirements and are not subject to corrective actions but are not allowed the
privileges of the well-capitalized banks. Banks in group 3, “undercapital-
ized,” fail to meet risk-based capital and leverage ratio requirements. Banks
in groups 4 and 5 are “signiﬁcantly undercapitalized” and “critically un-
dercapitalized,” respectively, and are not allowed to pay interest on their de-
posits at rates that are higher than average. Regulators still retain a fair
amount of discretion in their actions to deal with undercapitalized banks
and can choose from a smorgasbord of actions, such as restricting asset
growth, requiring the election of a new board of directors, prohibiting ac-
ceptance of deposits from correspondent depository institutions, prohibit-
ing capital distributions from any controlling bank holding company, and
terminating activities that pose excessive risk or performing divestiture of
nonbank subsidiaries that pose excessive risk.1On the other hand, FDICIA
mandates that regulators must require undercapitalized banks to submit an
acceptable capital restoration plan within forty-ﬁve days and implement the
plan. In addition, the regulatory agencies must take steps to close down crit-
ically undercapitalized banks (whose tangible equity capital is less than 2
percent of assets) by putting them in receivership or conservatorship within
ninety days, unless the appropriate agency and the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) concur that other action would better achieve the
purpose of prompt corrective action. If the bank continues to be critically
undercapitalized, it must be placed in receivership, unless speciﬁc statutory
requirements are met.
A key element of making prompt corrective action work is that bank su-
pervisors have suﬃcient government funds to close down institutions when
they become insolvent. It is very common that politicians and regulatory
authorities engage in wishful thinking when their banking systems are in
trouble, hoping that a large injection of public funds into the banking sys-
tem will be unnecessary.2 The result is regulatory forbearance, with insol-
vent institutions allowed to keep operating, which ends up producing dis-
astrous consequences. The Japanese authorities have engaged in exactly this
kind of behavior, but this was also a feature of the American response to the
S&L crisis up until 1989.
Not only must weak institutions be closed down, but it must be done in
the right way: funds must not be supplied to weak or insolvent banking in-
stitutions to keep them aﬂoat. To do so will just be throwing good taxpayer
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2. In addition, banking institutions often lobby vigorously to prevent the allocation of
public funds to close down insolvent institutions because this allows them to stay in business
and they hope, get out of the hole. This is exactly what happened in the United States in the
1980s, as is described in Mishkin (2001).money after bad. In the long run, injecting public funds into weak banks
does not deliver a restoration of the balance sheets of the banking system
because these weak banks continue to be weak and have strong moral haz-
ard incentives to take on big risks at the taxpayers’ expense. This is the les-
son learned from the U.S. experience in the 1980s as well as other countries
more recently. The way to recapitalize the banking system is to close down
all insolvent and weak institutions and sell oﬀ their assets to healthy insti-
tutions with public funds used to make the assets whole. If this is not pos-
sible, a public corporation, like the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in
the United States or KAMCO in Korea, can be created that will have the re-
sponsibility to sell oﬀ the assets of these closed banks as promptly as pos-
sible, so that the assets can be quickly put to productive uses by the private
sector.
To prevent ﬁnancial crises, it is also imperative that stockholders, man-
agers, and large uninsured creditors be punished when ﬁnancial institutions
are closed and public funds are injected into the ﬁnancial system. Protect-
ing managers, stockholders, and large uninsured creditors from the conse-
quences of excessive risk-taking increases the moral hazard problem im-
mensely and is thus highly dangerous, although it is common.
Focus on Risk Management
The traditional approach to bank supervision has focused on the quality
of the bank’s balance sheet at a point in time and whether the bank complies
with capital requirements. Although the traditional focus is important for
reducing excessive risk-taking by banks, it may no longer be adequate. First
is the point that capital may be extremely hard to measure. Furthermore, in
today’s world, ﬁnancial innovation has produced new markets and instru-
ments that make it easy for ﬁnancial institutions and their employees to
make huge bets quickly. In this new ﬁnancial environment, an institution
that is quite healthy at a particular point in time can be driven into insol-
vency extremely rapidly from trading losses, as has been forcefully demon-
strated by the failure of Barings in 1995, which, although initially well cap-
italized, was brought down by a rogue trader in a matter of months. Thus
an examination that focuses only on a bank’s or other ﬁnancial institution’s
balance sheet position at a point in time may not be eﬀective in indicating
whether a bank will in fact be taking on excessive risk in the near future.
For example, bank examiners in the United States are now placing far
greater emphasis on evaluating the soundness of bank’s management pro-
cesses with regard to controlling risk. This shift in thinking was reﬂected in
a new focus on risk management in the Federal Reserve System’s 1993 guid-
ance to examiners on trading and derivatives activities. The focus was ex-
panded and formalized in the Trading Activities Manual issued early in
1994, which provided bank examiners with tools to evaluate risk manage-
ment systems. In late 1995, the Federal Reserve and the comptroller of the
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cesses at the banks they supervise. Now bank examiners give a separate risk
management rating from 1 to 5, which feeds into the overall management
rating as part of the CAMELS system (the acronym is based on the six ar-
eas assessed: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and
sensitivity to market risk). Four elements of sound risk management are as-
sessed to come up with the risk management rating: (a) the quality of over-
sight provided by the board of directors and senior management, (b) the ad-
equacy of policies and limits for all activities that present signiﬁcant risks,
(c) the quality of the risk measurement and monitoring systems, and (d) the
adequacy of internal controls to prevent fraud or unauthorized activities on
the part of employees. Bank examiners get to see what best practice for risk
management is like in the banks they examine, and they can then make sure
that best practice spreads throughout the banking industry by giving poor
rankings to banks that are not up to speed.
Bank supervision in countries outside the United States would also help
promote a safer and sounder ﬁnancial sector by adopting similar measures
to ensure that risk management procedures in their banks are equal to the
best practice in ﬁnancial institutions elsewhere in the world.
Limiting Too-Big-To-Fail Policies
Because the failure of a very large ﬁnancial institution makes it more
likely that a major, systemic ﬁnancial disruption will occur, supervisors are
naturally reluctant to allow a big ﬁnancial institution to fail and cause
losses to depositors. The result is that most countries either explicitly or im-
plicitly have a too-big-to-fail policy, in which all depositors at a big bank,
both insured and uninsured, are fully protected if the bank fails. The prob-
lem with the too-big-to-fail policy is that it reduces market discipline on
large ﬁnancial institutions and thus increases their moral hazard incentives
to take on excessive risk. This problem is even more severe in emerging mar-
ket countries because their ﬁnancial systems are typically smaller than
those of industrialized countries and so tend to be dominated by fewer in-
stitutions. Furthermore, the connections with the government and political
power of large ﬁnancial institutions are often much greater in emerging
market countries, thus making it more likely that they will be bailed out if
they experience diﬃculties. Indeed, not only have uninsured depositors
been protected in many emerging market countries when large institutions
have been subject to failure, but other creditors and even equity holders
have been also.
Limiting moral hazard that arises from ﬁnancial institutions that are too
big or too politically connected to fail is a critical problem for prudential su-
pervision in emerging market countries. Thus, in order to reduce increased
incentives to take on excessive risk by large institutions, prudential super-
visors need to scrutinize them even more rigorously than smaller ones and,
Financial Policies 109at a minimum, must impose losses on shareholders and managers when
these institutions are insolvent. However, supervisors still have to face the
quandary of not wanting to allow a failure of a large ﬁnancial institution to
destabilize the ﬁnancial system, while keeping the moral hazard problem
created by too-big-to-fail institutions under control.
One proposal, outlined in Mishkin (1999), is for the supervisory agencies
to announce that there is a strong presumption that when there is a bank
failure, uninsured depositors would not be fully protected unless this is the
cheapest way to resolve the failure. It is important to recognize that al-
though large banking institutions may be too big to liquidate, they can be
closed, with losses imposed on uninsured creditors. Indeed, this is exactly
what FDICIA suggests should be done by specifying that, except under
very unusual circumstances when the a bank failure poses “serious adverse
eﬀects on economic conditions or ﬁnancial stability,” a least-cost resolution
procedure will be used to close down the bank. Ambiguity is created about
the use of this systemic-risk exception to the least-cost resolution rule be-
cause to invoke it requires a two-thirds majority of both the board of gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System and the directors of the FDIC, as well
as the approval of the secretary of the treasury.
An important concern is that the systemic-risk exception to least-cost
resolution will always be invoked when the failing bank is large enough be-
cause the government and central bank will be afraid to impose costs on de-
positors and other creditors when a potential ﬁnancial crisis is looming.
Thus, too-big-to-fail policies will still be alive, with all the negative conse-
quences for moral hazard risk-taking by the largest institutions. One way to
cope with this problem is for the authorities to announce that although they
are concerned about systemic risk possibilities, there will be a strong pre-
sumption that the ﬁrst large bank to fail will not be treated as too big to fail
and that costs will be imposed on uninsured depositors and creditors when
the bank is closed. Rather than bailing out the uninsured creditors at the ini-
tial large bank that fails, the authorities will stand ready to extend the safety
net to the rest of the banking system if they perceive that there is a serious
systemic risk problem.
The advantage of announcing such a stance is that uninsured depositors
and creditors now have to worry that if this bank is the ﬁrst one to fail, they
will not be bailed out. As a result, these depositors and creditors will now
have an incentive to withdraw their funds if they worry about the soundness
of the bank, even if it is very large, and this will alter the incentives of the
bank away from taking on too much risk. Clearly, moral hazard still re-
mains in the system, because the authorities stand ready to extend the
safety net to the rest of the system after the initial large institution fails if its
failure creates the potential for a banking crisis. However, the extent of
moral hazard is greatly reduced by the use of this form of constructive am-
biguity. Furthermore, the cost of this remaining moral hazard must be bal-
110 Frederic S. Mishkinanced against the beneﬁts of preventing a banking crisis if the initial bank
failure is likely to snowball into a systemic crisis.
Adequate Resources and Statutory Authority for 
Prudential Regulators/Supervisors
In many emerging market countries, prudential supervisors are not given
suﬃcient resources or statutory authority (the ability to issue cease and de-
sist orders and to close down insolvent banks) to do their jobs eﬀectively. For
example, in many emerging market countries, including even middle-income
countries such as Argentina and the Philippines, supervisors are subject to
lawsuits for their actions and can be held personally liable. Their salaries are
typically quite low and are much smaller relative to private-sector salaries
than in industrialized countries. Without suﬃcient resources and incentives,
not surprisingly, supervisors will not monitor banks suﬃciently in order to
keep them from engaging in inappropriately risky activities, to have the ap-
propriate management expertise and controls to manage risk, or to have
suﬃcient capital so that moral hazard incentives to take on excessive risk are
kept in check. Indeed, suﬃcient monitoring of banking institutions, not sur-
prisingly, has been absent in many emerging market and transition countries
(Mexico, Ecuador, and East Asia being recent examples), and this has also
been a very serious problem in industrialized countries. The resistance to
providing the S&L supervisory agencies with adequate resources to hire
suﬃcient bank examiners by the U.S. Congress was a key factor in making
the S&L crisis in the United States in the 1980s much worse. The inadequacy
of bank supervision in Japan and the problems it has caused are well known,
with the lack of resources for bank supervision being exempliﬁed by the fact
that the number of bank examiners in Japan is on the order of 400, in con-
trast to around 7,000 in the United States.
Giving supervisors suﬃcient resources and statutory authority to do
their jobs is thus crucial to promoting a safe and sound ﬁnancial system that
is resistant to ﬁnancial crises. Ruth Krivoy (2000), an ex-supervisor from
Venezuela during its banking crisis, has put the point very nicely by saying
that supervisors in emerging market countries must be given respect. If they
are paid poorly, the likelihood that they can be bribed either directly or
through promises of high-paying jobs by the institutions they supervise will
be very high. Making them personally liable for taking supervisory action
also makes it less likely that they will take the appropriate actions. Further-
more, if they do not have suﬃcient resources, particularly in information
technology, to monitor ﬁnancial institutions, then they will be unable to
spot excessive risk-taking.
Independence of Regulatory/Supervisory Agencies
Because prompt corrective action is so important, the bank regulatory/
supervisory agency requires suﬃcient independence from the political pro-
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gage in regulatory forbearance. One way to ensure against regulatory for-
bearance is to give the bank supervisory role to a politically independent
central bank. This has desirable elements, as pointed out in Mishkin (1991),
but some central banks might not want to have the supervisory task thrust
upon them because they worry that it might increase the likelihood that the
central bank would be politicized, thereby impinging on the independence
of the central bank. Alternatively, bank supervisory activities could be
housed in a bank regulatory authority that is independent of the govern-
ment.
Supervisory agencies will also not be suﬃciently independent if they are
starved for resources. If supervisory agencies have to come hat in hand to
the government for resources or funds to close down insolvent institutions,
they will be more subject to political pressure to engage in regulatory for-
bearance. Supervisors must have adequate ﬁnancial resources at their
ﬁngertips to prevent this from occurring.
Accountability of Supervisors
An important impediment to successful supervision of the ﬁnancial sys-
tem is that the relationship between taxpayers on the one hand and the su-
pervisors on the other creates a particular type of moral hazard problem,
the principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem occurs because
the agents (the supervisors) do not have the same incentives as the principal
(the taxpayer they ultimately work for) and so act in their own interest
rather than in the interest of the principal.
To act in the taxpayer’s interest, regulators have several tasks, as we have
seen. They must set restrictions on holding assets that are too risky, impose
suﬃciently high capital requirements, and close down insolvent institu-
tions. However, because of the principal-agent problem, supervisors have
incentives to do the opposite and engage in regulatory forbearance. One im-
portant incentive for supervisors that explains this phenomenon is their de-
sire to escape blame for poor performance by their agency. By loosening
capital requirements and pursuing regulatory forbearance, supervisors can
hide the problem of an insolvent bank and hope that the situation will im-
prove, a behavior that Kane (1989) characterizes as “bureaucratic gam-
bling.” Another important incentive for supervisors is that they may want
to protect their careers by acceding to pressures from the people who
strongly inﬂuence their careers, the politicians.
Supervisors must be accountable if they engage in regulatory forbear-
ance in order to improve incentives for them to do their job properly. For
example, as pointed out in Mishkin (1997), an important but very often
overlooked part of FDICIA that has helped make this legislation eﬀective
is that there is a mandatory report that the supervisory agencies must pro-
duce if the bank failure imposes costs on the FDIC. The resulting report is
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request, and the general accounting oﬃce must do an annual review of these
reports. Opening up the actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny
makes regulatory forbearance less attractive to them, thereby reducing the
principal-agent problem. In addition, subjecting the actions of bank super-
visors to public scrutiny reduces the incentives of politicians to lean on su-
pervisors to relax their supervision of banks.
In order for supervisors to do their jobs properly, they must also be sub-
ject to criminal prosecution if they are caught taking bribes and must also
be subject to censure and penalties if they take jobs with institutions that
they have supervised recently. This entails a change in culture for supervi-
sors in many emerging market countries, where some are allowed to get too
close to the institutions they supervise.
Restrictions on Connected Lending
A particular problem in the ﬁnancial sector, particularly in emerging
market countries, is connected lending, lending to the ﬁnancial institutions’
owners or managers or their business associates. Financial institutions
clearly have less incentive to monitor loans to their owners or managers,
thus increasing the moral hazard incentives for the borrowers to take on ex-
cessive risk, thereby exposing the institution to potential loan losses. In ad-
dition, connected lending in which large loans are made to one party can re-
sult in a lack of diversiﬁcation for the institution, thus increasing the risk
exposure of the bank.
Prudential supervision to restrict connected lending is clearly necessary
to reduce banks’ risk exposure. It can take several forms. One is disclosure
of the amount of connected lending. Indeed, one prominent feature of New
Zealand’s disclosure requirements is that the amount of lending to con-
nected persons is mandatory. Another is limits on the amount of connected
lending as a share of bank capital. Indeed, although New Zealand has got-
ten rid of many of the traditional regulatory guidelines, it still has chosen to
have prudential limits on the amount of connected lending. Most countries
have regulations limiting connected lending, and many emerging market
countries have stricter limits than in industrialized countries. However, a
key problem in emerging market and transition countries is that connected
lending limits are often not enforced eﬀectively. Folkerts-Landau et al.
(1995) have pointed out that bank examiners in Asia were often unable to
assess the exposure of banks to connected lending because of the use of
dummy accounts or the lack of authority for the examiners to trace where
the funds are used. Strong eﬀorts to increase disclosure and increased au-
thority for bank examiners to examine the books of the banks to root out
connected lending are crucial if this source of moral hazard is to be kept un-
der control.
Having commercial businesses owning large shares of ﬁnancial institu-
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the Korean ﬁnancial crisis was that the chaebol were allowed large owner-
ship stakes in merchant banks, which were virtually unsupervised. The mer-
chant banks were then used as a conduit for greatly increasing the chaebol’s
leverage by supplying them with large amounts of funds by borrowing
abroad and then lending the proceeds to them. The excessive risk-taking by
the merchant banks eventually resulted in insolvency for most of them and
was an important factor that led to the Korean ﬁnancial crisis (Hahm and
Mishkin 2000). Preventing commercial enterprises from owning ﬁnancial
institutions is crucial for promoting ﬁnancial stability in emerging market
countries.
Accounting Standards and Disclosure Requirements
Accounting standards and disclosure requirements for ﬁnancial institu-
tions are often particularly lacking in emerging market and transition coun-
tries but also in a number of industrialized countries (Japan being the most
prominent example). Without the appropriate information, both markets
and supervisors will not be able adequately to monitor ﬁnancial institutions
to deter excessive risk-taking.3 One prominent example is that accounting
and supervisory conventions in many countries allow banks to make non-
performing loans look good by lending additional money to the troubled
borrower, who uses the proceeds to make the payments on the nonper-
forming loan, thus keeping it current, a practice known as “evergreening.”
The result is that nonperforming loans are signiﬁcantly understated, which
makes it harder for the markets to discipline ﬁnancial institutions or for su-
pervisors to decide when banks are insolvent and need to be closed down.
Many countries also do not require the reporting of key ﬁnancial data by in-
dividual ﬁnancial institutions, including their consolidated ﬁnancial expo-
sure, which makes it hard to sort out healthy from unhealthy institutions.
Implementing proper accounting standards and disclosure requirements is
an important ﬁrst step in promoting a healthy ﬁnancial system.4
An interesting example of an attempt to beef up disclosure requirements
and raise their prominence in prudential supervision is the system put in
place in New Zealand in 1996 (see Mortlock 1996 and Nicholl 1996). New
Zealand scrapped its previous system of regular bank examinations and re-
placed it with one based on disclosure requirements that uses the market to
police the behavior of the banks. Every bank in New Zealand must supply
a comprehensive quarterly ﬁnancial statement that provides, among other
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oﬀ-balance-sheet and oﬀshore derivatives contracts were used by Mexican banks before the
Tequila crisis to get around regulations that were intended to prevent them from taking on for-
eign exchange risk, and this played an important role in the Mexican crisis.
4. See Goldstein and Turner (1996) and Goldstein (1997) for a further discussion of what
steps need to be taken to beef up accounting standards and disclosure requirements.things, information on the quality of its assets, capital adequacy, lending ac-
tivities, proﬁtability, and its ratings from private credit-rating agencies and
whether it has a credit rating. These ﬁnancial statements must be audited
twice a year, and not only must they be provided to the central bank, but
they must also be made public, with a two-page summary posted in all bank
branches. In addition, bank directors are required to validate these state-
ments and state publicly that their bank’s risk management systems are ad-
equate and being properly implemented. A most unusual feature of this sys-
tem is that bank directors face unlimited liability if they are found to have
made false or misleading statements.
The New Zealand example illustrates that disclosure requirements can be
strengthened appreciably. However, suggesting that sole reliance on disclo-
sure requirements to police the banking system is a workable model for
other countries is going too far. Depositors are unlikely to have the sophis-
tication to understand fully the information provided and thus may not im-
pose the necessary discipline on the banks. Furthermore, unlimited liabil-
ity for directors might discourage top people from taking these positions,
thereby weakening the management of the banks. Although disclosure re-
quirements might be suﬃcient in New Zealand because almost all New
Zealand banks are foreign-owned, so that bank supervision has been in
eﬀect outsourced to the supervisors of the foreign banks that own the New
Zealand banks, it is unlikely to work in countries where most of the bank-
ing system is domestically owned.
Legal and Judicial Systems
The legal and judicial systems are very important for promoting the ef-
ﬁcient functioning of the ﬁnancial system, and the inadequacies of legal
systems in many countries are a serious problem for ﬁnancial markets. If
property rights are unclear or hard to enforce, the process of ﬁnancial
intermediation can be severely hampered. Collateral can be an eﬀective
mechanism to reduce adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit
markets because it reduces the lender’s losses in the case of a default. How-
ever, in many developing countries, the legal system prevents the use of cer-
tain assets as collateral or makes attaching collateral a costly and time-
consuming process, thereby reducing the eﬀectiveness of collateral to solve
asymmetric information problems (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod 1996). Sim-
ilarly, bankruptcy procedures in developing countries are frequently very
cumbersome (or even nonexistent), resulting in lengthy delays in resolving
conﬂicting claims. Resolution of bankruptcies in which the books of insol-
vent ﬁrms are opened up and assets are redistributed can be viewed as a pro-
cess to decrease asymmetric information in the marketplace. Furthermore,
slow resolution of bankruptcies can delay recovery from a ﬁnancial crisis,
because only when bankruptcies have been resolved is there enough infor-
mation in the ﬁnancial system to restore it to healthy operation.
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There are two problems with relying on supervisors to control risk-taking
by ﬁnancial institutions. First, ﬁnancial institutions have incentives to keep
information away from bank examiners so that they are not restricted in
their activities. Thus, even if supervisors are conscientious, they may not be
able to stop institutions from engaging in risky activities. Second, because
of the principal-agent problem, supervisors may engage in regulatory for-
bearance and not do their jobs properly.
An answer to these problems is to have the market discipline ﬁnancial in-
stitutions if they are taking on too much risk. We have already mentioned
that disclosure requirements can help provide information to the markets
that may help them monitor ﬁnancial institutions and keep them from tak-
ing on too much risk. Two additional steps may help increase market disci-
pline. One is to require that ﬁnancial institutions have credit ratings. Part of
the bonds, auditing, supervision, information, and credit ratings (BASIC)
supervisory system implemented in Argentina in December 1996 is the re-
quirement that every bank have an annual rating provided by a rating
agency registered with the central bank.5 Institutions with more than $50
million in assets are required to have ratings from two rating agencies. As
part of this scheme, the Argentine central bank is responsible for perform-
ing an after-the-fact review of the credit ratings to check if the rating agen-
cies are doing a reasonable job. As of January 1998, these credit ratings
must be published on billboards in the banks and must also appear on all
deposit certiﬁcates and all other publications related to obtaining funds
from the public. As part of New Zealand’s disclosure requirements, all
banks must prominently display their credit ratings on their long-term sen-
ior unsecured liabilities payable in New Zealand or, alternatively, indicate if
they do not have a credit rating. Clearly, the lack of a credit rating or a poor
credit rating is expected to cause depositors and other creditors to be reluc-
tant to put their funds in the bank, thus giving the bank incentive to reduce
its risk-taking and boost its credit rating. This has a higher likelihood of
working in Argentina and New Zealand because both countries do not have
government deposit insurance.
Another way to impose market discipline on banks is to require that they
issue subordinated debt (uninsured debt that is junior to insured deposits,
but senior to equity). Subordinated debt, particularly if it has a ceiling on
the spread between its interest rate and that on government securities, can
be an eﬀective disciplining device. If the bank is exposed to too much risk,
it is unlikely to be able to sell its subordinated debt. Thus, compliance with
the subordinated debt requirement will be a direct way for the market to
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tion of the Argentine BASIC system.force banks to limit their risk exposure. Alternatively, deposit insurance
premiums could be charged according to the interest rate on the subordi-
nated debt. Not only would the issuance of subordinated debt directly help
reduce incentives for banks to engage in risky activities, but it could also
provide supplemental information to bank examiners that could help them
in their supervisory activities. In addition, information about whether
banks are successful in issuing subordinated debt and the interest rate on
this debt can help the public evaluate whether supervisors are being suﬃ-
ciently tough on a particular banking institution, thus reducing the scope
of the principal-agent problem.
Argentina has implemented a subordinated debt requirement in its BA-
SIC program, although without an interest rate cap, which took eﬀect on
January 1998. As reported in Calomiris (1998), initially about half of the
banks have been able to comply with this requirement. Interestingly, as ex-
pected, it is the weakest banks that have had trouble issuing subordinated
debt. Furthermore, banks that compiled with the requirement had lower
deposit rates and larger growth in deposits. Thus, the subordinated debt re-
quirement looks like it has had the intended eﬀect of promoting discipline
on the banks (Calomiris and Powell 2001).
Entry of Foreign Banks
Many countries have restrictions on the entry of foreign banks. The en-
try of foreign banks should be seen not as a threat but as an opportunity to
strengthen the banking system. In all but a few large countries, domestic
banks are unable to diversify because their lending is concentrated in the
home country. In contrast, foreign banks have more diversiﬁed portfolios
and also usually have access to sources of funds from all over the world
through their parent company. This diversiﬁcation means that these foreign
banks are exposed to less risk and are less aﬀected by negative shocks to the
home country’s economy. Because many emerging market and transition
economies are more volatile than industrialized countries, having a large
foreign component to the banking sector is especially valuable, because it
helps insulate the banking system from domestic shocks. Encouraging en-
try of foreign banks is thus likely to lead to a banking and ﬁnancial system
that is substantially less fragile and far less prone to crisis.
Another reason for encouraging the entry of foreign banks is that this can
encourage adoption of best practice in the banking industry. Foreign banks
come with expertise in areas like risk management. As mentioned earlier,
when bank examiners in a country see better practices in risk management,
they can spread these practices throughout their country’s banking system
by downgrading banks that do not adopt these practices. Having foreign
banks demonstrate the latest risk management techniques can thus lead to
improved control of risk in the home country’s banking system. Clearly,
there are also beneﬁts from the increased competition that foreign bank en-
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banks will also lead to improved management techniques and a more eﬃ-
cient banking system.
Encouraging the entry of foreign banks also makes it more likely that
uninsured depositors and other creditors of banks will not be bailed out.
Governments are far less likely to bail out the banking sector when it gets
into trouble if many of the banks are foreign-owned because it will be po-
litically unpopular. Thus uninsured depositors and other creditors will have
greater incentives to monitor the banks and pull out funds if these institu-
tions take on too much risk. The resulting increase in market discipline is
therefore likely to encourage more prudent behavior by banking institu-
tions.
Capital Controls
In the aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crises in Mexico and East Asia, in
which the crisis countries experienced large capital inﬂows before the crisis
and large capital outﬂows after the crisis, much attention has been focused
on whether international capital movements are a major source of ﬁnancial
instability. The asymmetric information analysis of the crisis suggests that
international capital movements can have an important role in producing
ﬁnancial instability, but as we have seen this is because the presence of a
government safety net with inadequate supervision of banking institutions
encourages capital inﬂows, which lead to a lending boom and excessive
risk-taking on the part of banks.6Consistent with this view, works by Gavin
and Hausman (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) do ﬁnd that lend-
ing booms are a predictor of banking crises, yet it is by no means clear that
capital inﬂows will produce a lending boom that causes a deterioration in
bank balance sheets. Indeed, Kaminsky and Reinhart ﬁnd that ﬁnancial lib-
eralization, rather than balance-of-payments developments inﬂows, ap-
pears to be an important predictor of banking crises.
Capital outﬂows have also been pointed to as a source of foreign ex-
change crises, which, as we have seen, can promote ﬁnancial instability in
emerging market countries. In this view, foreigners pull their capital out of
country, and the resulting capital outﬂow is what forces a country to de-
value its currency. However, as pointed out earlier, a key factor leading to
foreign exchange crises are problems in the ﬁnancial sector that lead to the
speculative attack and capital outﬂows. With this view, the capital outﬂow
associated with the foreign exchange crisis is a symptom of underlying fun-
damental problems rather than a cause of the currency crisis. The consen-
sus from many empirical studies (see the excellent survey in Kaminsky, Li-
zondo, and Reinhart [1997]) provides support for this view because capital
ﬂow or current account measures do not have predictive power in forecast-
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lems in the banking sector helps predict currency crises.
The analysis here therefore does not provide a case for capital controls
such as the exchange controls that have recently been adopted in Malaysia.
Exchange controls are like throwing out the baby with the bathwater. Cap-
ital controls have the undesirable feature that they may block funds from
entering a country that will be used for productive investment opportuni-
ties. Although these controls may limit the fuel supplied to lending booms
through capital ﬂows, over time they produce substantial distortions and
misallocation of resources as households and businesses try to get around
them. Indeed, there are serious doubts as to whether capital controls can be
eﬀective in today’s environment, in which trade is open and there are many
ﬁnancial instruments that make it easier to get around these controls.
On the other hand, there is a strong case to improve bank regulation and
supervision so that capital inﬂows are less likely to produce a lending boom
and excessive risk-taking by banking institutions. For example, banks
might be restricted in how fast their borrowing could grow, and this might
have the impact of substantially limiting capital inﬂows. These prudential
controls could be thought of as a form of capital controls, but they are quite
diﬀerent from the typical exchange controls. They focus on the sources of
ﬁnancial fragility, rather than the symptoms, and supervisory controls of
this type can enhance the eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial system rather than ham-
pering it.
Reduction of the Role of State-Owned Financial Institutions
A feature of many countries’ ﬁnancial systems, particularly in emerging
market and transition countries, is government interventions to direct
credit either to themselves or to favored sectors or individuals in the econ-
omy. Governments do this either by setting interest rates at artiﬁcially low
levels for certain types of loans, by creating development ﬁnance institu-
tions to make speciﬁc types of loans, by setting up state-owned banks that
can provide funds to favored entities, or by directing private institutions to
lend to certain entities. Private institutions clearly have an incentive to solve
adverse selection and moral hazard problems and lend to borrowers who
have productive investment opportunities. Governments have less incentive
to do so because they are not driven by the proﬁt motive, so their directed
credit programs or state-owned banks are less likely to channel funds to
those borrowers who will help produce high growth of the economy. This
type of government intervention in the credit markets is therefore likely to
result in less eﬃcient investment and slower growth. Curtailing this govern-
ment activity is therefore important for promoting economic growth
(Caprio and Honohan 2000).
The absence of a proﬁt motive also means that state-owned banks are less
likely to manage risk properly and be eﬃcient. Thus it is not surprising that
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institutions, and countries with the highest share of state-owned banks, on
average, are also the ones with a higher percentage of nonperforming loans
and higher operating costs (Goldstein and Turner 1996; Caprio and Hono-
han 2000). Thus, the presence of state-owned banks can substantially
weaken the banking system. The ineﬃciency of state-owned banks and
their higher loan losses strongly argue for privatization of the banking sec-
tor. However, even privatization must be managed properly or it can lead to
disaster. If purchasers of banks are those who are likely to engage in exces-
sive risk-taking or even fraud, the possibility that banking problems will
arise in the future is high. Also, if purchasers of banks are allowed to put
very little of their own capital into the bank, they may also have strong in-
centives to engage in risky activities at the depositors’ and taxpayers’ ex-
pense. These potential downsides of privatization do not indicate that pri-
vatization should be avoided, but rather suggest that the chartering or
licensing process be suﬃciently stringent to screen out bad owners, making
sure that bank ownership goes to individuals who will improve bank per-
formance over the previous government managers.
Restrictions on Foreign-Denominated Debt
The asymmetric information view of ﬁnancial crises indicates that a debt
structure with substantial foreign-denominated debt, which is typical in
many emerging market countries, makes the ﬁnancial system more fragile.
Currency crises and devaluations do trigger full-ﬂedged ﬁnancial crises in
countries with foreign-denominated debt, whereas this is not the case for
countries whose debt is denominated in domestic currency.
The presence of foreign-denominated debt also makes it far more diﬃcult
for a country to recover from a ﬁnancial crisis. Industrialized countries with
debt denominated in domestic currency can promote recovery by pursuing
expansionary monetary policy by injecting liquidity (reserves) into the ﬁ-
nancial system. Injecting reserves, either through open-market operations
or by lending to the banking sector, causes the money supply to increase,
which in turn leads to a higher price level. Given that debt contracts are de-
nominated in domestic currency and many are often of fairly long duration,
the reﬂation of the economy causes the debt burden of households and ﬁrms
to fall, thereby increasing their net worth. As outlined earlier, higher net
worth then leads to reduced adverse selection and moral hazard problems in
ﬁnancial markets, undoing the increase in adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems induced by the ﬁnancial crisis. In addition, injecting liquidity
into the economy raises asset prices such as land and stock market values,
which also causes an improvement in net worth and a reduction in adverse
selection and moral hazard problems. Also, as discussed in Mishkin (1996a),
expansionary monetary policy promotes economic recovery through other
mechanisms involving the stock market and the foreign exchange market.
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crisis is to pursue the so-called lender-of-last-resort role, in which the cen-
tral bank stands ready to lend freely during a ﬁnancial crisis. By restoring
liquidity to the ﬁnancial sector, the lender of last resort can help shore up
the balance sheets of ﬁnancial ﬁrms, thereby preventing a systemic shock
from spreading and bringing down the ﬁnancial system. There are many
instances of successful lender-of-last-resort operations in industrialized
countries (see, e.g., Mishkin 1991); the Federal Reserve’s intervention on
the day after the 19 October 1987 stock market crash is one example. In-
deed, what is striking about this episode is that the extremely quick inter-
vention of the Federal Reserve not only resulted in a negligible impact on
the economy of the stock market crash, but also meant that the amount of
liquidity that the Federal Reserve needed to supply to the economy was not
very large (see Mishkin 1991).
However, if the ﬁnancial system has a large amount of foreign-
denominated debt it may be far more diﬃcult for the central bank to pro-
mote recovery from a ﬁnancial crisis. With this debt structure, a central
bank can no longer use expansionary monetary policy to promote recovery
from a ﬁnancial crisis. Suppose that the policy prescription for countries
with little foreign-denominated debt—that is, expansionary monetary pol-
icy and reﬂation of the economy—were followed in an emerging market
country with a large amount of foreign-denominated debt. In this case the
expansionary monetary policy is likely to cause the domestic currency to
depreciate sharply. As we have seen before, the depreciation of the domes-
tic currency leads to a deterioration in ﬁrms’ and banks’ balance sheets be-
cause much of their debt is denominated in foreign currency, thus raising
the burden of indebtedness and lowering banks’ and ﬁrms’ net worth.
The net result of an expansionary monetary policy in an emerging mar-
ket country with a large amount of foreign-denominated debt is that it hurts
the balance sheets of households, ﬁrms, and banks. Thus, expansionary
monetary policy has the opposite result to that found in industrialized
countries after a ﬁnancial crisis: it causes a deterioration in balance sheets
and therefore ampliﬁes adverse selection and moral hazard problems in ﬁ-
nancial markets caused by a ﬁnancial crisis, rather than ameliorating them,
as in the industrialized country case.
For similar reasons, lender-of-last-resort activities by a central bank in an
emerging market country with substantial foreign-denominated debt may
not be as successful as in an industrialized country. Central bank lending to
the ﬁnancial system in the wake of a ﬁnancial crisis that expands domestic
credit might lead to a substantial depreciation of the domestic currency, with
the result that balance sheets will deteriorate, making recovery from the ﬁ-
nancial crisis less likely. The use of the lender-of-last-resort role by a central
bank is therefore much trickier in countries with a large amount of foreign-
denominated debt because central bank lending is now a two-edged sword.
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to ﬁnancial crises and could recover far more easily if the issuance of
foreign-denominated debt was discouraged. Because much foreign-
denominated debt is intermediated through the banking system, regula-
tions to restrict both bank lending and borrowing in foreign currencies
could greatly enhance ﬁnancial stability. Similarly, restrictions on corporate
borrowing in foreign currency or tax policies to discourage foreign-
currency borrowing could help make the economy better able to withstand
a currency depreciation without undergoing a ﬁnancial crisis. Krueger
(2000) has also suggested that restrictions should be placed on ﬁnancial in-
stitutions in industrialized countries to limit lending to emerging market
countries using industrialized-country currencies.
Elimination of Too-Big-To-Fail in the Corporate Sector
We have already discussed why a too-big-to-fail policy leads to increased
risk-taking by ﬁnancial institutions. The same incentives clearly apply to
corporations if they are considered to be too big to fail (or too politically in-
ﬂuential) by the government. Lenders, knowing that they are unlikely to be
subjected to losses if the corporation gets into trouble, will not monitor the
corporation and withdraw funds if it is taking on excessive risk. In many
emerging market countries, governments have propped up large and polit-
ically connected corporations when they suﬀer ﬁnancial distress, and this
has been a source of increased risk-taking by these companies, especially
when they face diﬃcult times. For example, as pointed out in Hahm and
Mishkin (2000), the Korean government was perceived to have a too-big-
to-fail policy for the chaebol, whose proﬁtability dropped in the 1990s.
Given the resulting lack of market discipline, they proceeded to try to grow
out of their problems by borrowing, frequently in foreign currency, and dra-
matically increasing their leverage. This increase in risk-taking then was a
key factor generating the ﬁnancial crisis in Korea.
To contain incentives for the corporate sector to increase leverage and
take on too much risk that leaves them extremely vulnerable to adverse
shocks, it is imperative that too-big-to-fail policies be eliminated. This im-
plies a greater separation between the corporate sector and the government,
something that also requires a change in business culture in many emerging
market countries.
Sequencing Financial Liberalization
Deregulation and liberalization of the ﬁnancial system have swept
through almost all countries in recent years. Although deregulation and lib-
eralization are highly desirable objectives, the analysis of ﬁnancial crises in
this paper indicates that if this process is not managed properly, it can be
disastrous. If the proper bank regulatory/supervisory structure, accounting
and disclosure requirements, restrictions on connected lending, and well-
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comes, the appropriate constraints on risk-taking behavior will be far too
weak. The result will be that bad loans are likely, with potentially disastrous
consequences for bank balance sheets at some point in the future.
In addition, before liberalization occurs, banks may not have the expert-
ise to make loans wisely, so opening them up to new lending opportunities
may also lead to poor quality of the loan portfolio. We have also seen that
ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization often lead to a lending boom, be-
cause of both increased opportunities for bank lending and ﬁnancial deep-
ening, in which more funds ﬂow into the banking system. Although ﬁnan-
cial deepening is a positive development for the economy in the long run, in
the short run the lending boom may outstrip the available information re-
sources in the ﬁnancial system, helping to promote a ﬁnancial collapse in
the future.
The dangers in ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization do not imply that
countries would be better oﬀ by not pursuing a liberalization strategy. To
the contrary, ﬁnancial liberalization is critical to the eﬃcient functioning of
ﬁnancial markets so that they can channel funds to those with the most pro-
ductive investment opportunities. Getting funds to those with the most pro-
ductive investment opportunities is especially critical to emerging market
countries because these investments can have especially high returns,
thereby stimulating rapid economic growth. However, proper sequencing of
ﬁnancial deregulation and liberalization is critical to its success. It is im-
portant that policymakers put in place the proper institutional structure
before liberalizing their ﬁnancial systems, especially if there are no restric-
tions on ﬁnancial institutions’ seeking funds abroad or issuing foreign-
denominated debt. Before ﬁnancial markets are fully liberalized, it is crucial
that the precepts outlined above be implemented: provision of suﬃcient re-
sources and statutory authority to bank supervisors, adoption of prompt
corrective action provisions, an appropriate focus on risk management, in-
dependence of bank regulators/supervisors from short-run political pres-
sure, increased accountability of bank supervisors, limitations on too-big-
to-fail policies, adoption of adequate accounting standards and disclosure
requirements, suﬃcient restrictions on connected lending, improvements in
the legal and judicial systems, encouragement of market-based discipline,
and encouragement of entry of foreign banks.
Because the above measures are not easy to install quickly and because
of the stresses that rapid expansion of the ﬁnancial sector puts on both
managerial and supervisory resources, restricting the growth of credit when
ﬁnancial liberalization is put into place makes a lot of sense. This can take
the form of putting upper limits on ratios of loans to value, or, for consumer
credit, setting maximum repayment periods and minimum down payment
percentages. Banks could also be restricted in how fast certain types of their
loan portfolios are allowed to grow. In addition, at the beginning of the lib-
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tial controls that might limit capital inﬂows may be necessary to reduce the
vulnerability of the ﬁnancial system. As the appropriate infrastructure is
put into place, these restrictions can be reduced. The bottom line is that, al-
though eventually a full ﬁnancial liberalization is a worthy goal, to avoid ﬁ-
nancial crises ﬁnancial liberalization needs to proceed at a measured pace,
with some restrictions imposed along the way.
Monetary Policy and Price Stability
It is also important to recognize that, although it is only indirectly a ﬁ-
nancial policy, monetary policy can play an important role in promoting ﬁ-
nancial stability. Price stability is a worthy goal in its own right. Not only do
public opinion surveys indicate that the public is very hostile to inﬂation,
but there is also mounting evidence from econometric studies that inﬂation
is harmful to the economy.7
The asymmetric information analysis of ﬁnancial crises provides addi-
tional reasons why price stability is so important. As was mentioned earlier,
when countries have a past history of high inﬂation, debt contracts are of-
ten denominated in foreign currencies. As we have seen, this feature of debt
contracts makes the ﬁnancial system more fragile because currency depre-
ciation can trigger a ﬁnancial crisis. Achieving price stability is a necessary
condition for having a sound currency, and with a sound currency, it is far
easier for banks, nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, and the government to raise capital
with debt denominated in domestic currency. Thus, another method for re-
ducing an economy’s dependence on foreign-denominated debt and en-
hancing ﬁnancial stability is the successful pursuit of price stability.
Furthermore, central banks that have successfully pursued price stability
have suﬃcient credibility that expansionary monetary policy or a lender-of-
last-resort operation in the face of a ﬁnancial crisis is less likely to result in
a rise in inﬂation expectations and a sharp depreciation of the currency that
would harm balance sheets. Thus countries that have successfully pursued
price stability have an enhanced ability to use monetary policy tools to pro-
mote recovery from a ﬁnancial crisis.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Foreign Exchange Reserves
Although we have seen that the pursuit of price stability can enhance ﬁ-
nancial stability and is thus desirable, some methods of pursuing price sta-
bility can unfortunately promote ﬁnancial instability. One commonly used
method to achieve price stability is to peg the value of currency to that of a
large, low-inﬂation country. In some cases, this strategy involves pegging
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the growth rate. See the survey in Anderson and Gruen (1995) and Fischer (1993), one of the
most cited papers in this literature.the exchange rate at a ﬁxed value to that of the other country’s currency so
that its inﬂation rate will eventually gravitate to that of the other country. In
other cases, the strategy involves a crawling peg or target in which one coun-
try’s currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate against that of an-
other country so that its inﬂation rate can be higher than that of the coun-
try to which it is pegged.
Although adhering to a ﬁxed or pegged exchange rate regime can be a
successful strategy for controlling inﬂation, the analysis of ﬁnancial crises
in this paper illustrates how dangerous this strategy can be for an emerging
market country with a large amount of foreign-denominated debt. Under a
pegged exchange rate regime, when a successful speculative attack occurs,
the decline in the value of the domestic currency is usually much larger,
more rapid, and more unanticipated than when a depreciation occurs un-
der a ﬂoating exchange rate regime. For example, during the Mexican crisis
of 1994–95, the value of the peso fell by half in only a few months time,
whereas in the recent Southeast Asian crisis, the worst-hit country, Indone-
sia, saw its currency decline to less than one-quarter of its precrisis value,
also in a very short period of time. The damage to balance sheets after these
devaluations was extremely severe. In Mexico, the net debtor position of
business enterprises increased several times from before the devaluation in
December 1994 until March 1995, whereas in Indonesia the greater than
fourfold increase in the value of foreign debt arising from the currency col-
lapse made it very diﬃcult for Indonesian ﬁrms with appreciable foreign
debt to remain solvent. The deterioration of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms’ balance
sheets leads to a deterioration in bank balance sheets because borrowers
from the banks are now less likely to be able to pay oﬀ their loans. The re-
sult of this collapse in balance sheets was sharp economic contractions. In
Mexico, real GDP growth in the second and third quarters of 1995 fell to
rates around –10 percent, whereas Indonesia experienced an even worse
rate of decline, with GDP falling by close to 15 percent in 1998, and has an
economy still in shambles.
Another potential danger from an exchange rate peg is that, by providing
a more stable value of the currency, it might lower risk for foreign investors
and thus encourage capital inﬂows. Although these capital inﬂows might be
channeled into productive investments and thus stimulate growth, they
might promote excessive lending, manifested by a lending boom, because
domestic ﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks play a key role in interme-
diating these capital inﬂows (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1994). In-
deed, Folkerts-Landau et al. (1995) found that emerging market countries
in the Asia-Paciﬁc region with large net private capital inﬂows also experi-
enced large increases in their banking sectors. Furthermore, if the bank su-
pervisory process is weak, as it often is in emerging market and transition
countries, so that the government safety net for banking institutions creates
incentives for them to take on risk, the likelihood that a capital inﬂow will
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vision, the likely outcome of a lending boom is substantial loan losses, a de-
terioration of bank balance sheets, and a possible ﬁnancial crisis.8
A ﬂexible exchange rate regime has the advantage that movements in the
exchange rate are much less nonlinear than in a pegged exchange rate
regime. Indeed, the daily ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate in a ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime have the advantage of making clear to private ﬁrms,
banks, and governments that there is substantial risk involved in issuing li-
abilities denominated in foreign currencies. Furthermore, a depreciation of
the exchange rate may provide an early warning signal to policymakers that
their policies may have to be adjusted in order to limit the potential for a ﬁ-
nancial crisis.
The conclusion is that a pegged exchange rate regime may increase ﬁ-
nancial instability in emerging market countries. However, this conclusion
does not indicate that ﬁxing or pegging an exchange rate to control inﬂation
is always inappropriate. Indeed, countries with a past history of poor inﬂa-
tion performance may ﬁnd that only with a very strong commitment mech-
anism to an exchange rate peg (as in a currency board or full dollarization)
can inﬂation be controlled (Mishkin 1998; Mishkin and Savastano 2001).
However, the analysis does suggest that countries using this strategy to con-
trol inﬂation must actively pursue policies that will promote a healthy bank-
ing system. Furthermore, if a country has an institutional structure of a
fragile banking system and substantial debt denominated in foreign cur-
rencies, using an exchange rate peg, particularly one with a weak commit-
ment mechanism, to control inﬂation can be a very dangerous strategy in-
deed.9 This is one reason that countries, like Korea, that in the past year
have de facto pegged their exchange rate by allowing it to ﬂuctuate only
within very narrow bounds may be leaving themselves more exposed to fu-
ture ﬁnancial crises than they realize.
Another feature of recent currency and ﬁnancial crises is that countries
with low amounts of international reserves relative to short-term foreign li-
abilities seemed to be more vulnerable to crises. This has led some re-
searchers (e.g., Radelet and Sachs 1998) to advocate increased holdings of
international reserves to insulate countries from ﬁnancial crises. Indeed,
many emerging market countries have taken this recommendation to heart
by accumulating large amounts of reserves after their ﬁnancial crises. For
example, Korea currently has accumulated international reserves near the
$100 billion level. Although the accumulation of large amounts of interna-
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booms are a predictor of banking crises, yet it is less clear that capital inﬂows will produce a
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regimes may be undesirable.tional reserves may make emerging market countries less vulnerable to cur-
rency crises, it is unlikely to insulate them from a ﬁnancial crisis if the ﬁ-
nancial sector is suﬃciently weakened. A large accumulation of interna-
tional reserves has the potential to lull an emerging market country into
complacency about taking the steps to ensure a safe and sound ﬁnancial
system and thus could have a hidden danger.
2.1.6 Concluding Remarks
The bad news is that in recent years we have seen a growing number of
banking and ﬁnancial crises in emerging market countries, with great costs
to their economies. The good news, however, is that we now have a much
better understanding of why banking and ﬁnancial crises occur in emerging
market countries and so have a better idea of how these crises can be pre-
vented. This paper has outlined a set of ﬁnancial policies that can help make
ﬁnancial crises less likely. If the political will to adopt these policies in
emerging market countries grows, then we should see healthier ﬁnancial
systems in these countries in the future, with substantial gains both from
higher economic growth and smaller economic ﬂuctuations.
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2. Andrew Crockett
Mishkin’s paper deﬁnes a ﬁnancial crisis as a breakdown of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation due to an intensiﬁcation of asymmetric information problems.
Although this deﬁnition may not capture all elements of all ﬁnancial crises,
it has several important merits.
1. It focuses on the ways in which ﬁnancial crisis impairs the perfor-
mance of the real economy, and not just the ﬁscal or resolution costs.
2. It forces us to ask what causes moral hazard and adverse selection and
thus to see more clearly the danger signals of impending crisis as well as the
possible remedies.
3. It is a helpful framework for interpreting the feedback mechanisms
between currency and ﬁnancial crises.
The heart of Mishkin’s paper is the analysis of twelve features of the ﬁnan-
cial system, through which actions could usefully be taken to limit the scope
for moral hazard and adverse selection, and thus reduce the likelihood of
crisis. To simplify, I will group his proposals into ﬁve broad families and
comment on each. The ﬁve families are
1. The macroeconomic environment
2. Competition and market discipline
3. The infrastructure for ﬁnancial activity
4. Prudential supervision
5. Restrictions and controls
The Macroeconomic Environment
A stable ﬁnancial environment is obviously important for the eﬀective
pricing and management of risk. Financial intermediaries can do a better
job, and are less likely to get into trouble, if inﬂation is low and stable and
the budgetary position is sustainable. There is little dispute about this.
More controversial is the exchange rate regime. For the same reason that
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ﬁts from stability in the exchange rate. The question is what regime delivers
the greater degree of stability. Our discussion this morning covered this
matter extensively.
Here, I want to make only one additional observation. The least satisfac-
tory regime is one of the ﬁxed-but-adjustable rates in which the authorities
invest political credibility in defending an announced rate but are not pre-
pared to accept the full discipline of a currency board. Almost without ex-
ception, such regimes have encouraged resistance to market pressures be-
yond the point at which such resistance could be justiﬁed.
Fixed-but-adjustable rates contribute to the buildup of ﬁnancial imbal-
ances by encouraging the mispricing of risk while the rate is ﬁxed. And
when a peg is broken, the balance sheet consequences can severely impair
ﬁnancial intermediation. I conclude, therefore, that exchange rate ﬂexibil-
ity (not necessarily free ﬂoating) is for most countries a part of the sustain-
able macroeconomic environment. This does not mean that countries
should not hold views about their exchange rates and even direct some poli-
cies toward stabilizing it. It does mean that they should avoid declaring a
rate and using intervention to defend it.
Competition and Market Discipline
Competition and market discipline are important mechanisms for im-
proving the eﬃciency of ﬁnancial systems. Mishkin makes a number of
sensible suggestions that are not less important for being fairly familiar.
They include encouraging the entry of foreign-owned ﬁnancial institutions;
privatization and the withdrawal of state intervention in the ﬁnancial sys-
tem; eschewal of “too-big-to-fail” policies, in both the ﬁnancial and the cor-
porate sector; and greater use of the issue of subordinated debt.
Still, a cautionary note is needed. Although these measures are useful,
their introduction in emerging markets is not straightforward. Opening ﬁ-
nancial sectors to foreign participation is politically sensitive in a number
of countries, sometimes for deep-seated historical and psychological rea-
sons. The withdrawal of the state cannot be unconditional, unless the spon-
taneous emergence of private-sector substitutes for certain activities can be
ensured; the abandonment of too-big-to-fail policies requires an assurance
that alternative mechanisms for the orderly resolution of distress are avail-
able and that the means to protect depositors exist. And subordinated debt
may be less eﬀective as a mechanism in countries where banks are small and
debt markets underdeveloped.
The Financial Infrastructure
Mishkin draws attention to the importance of sound accounting stan-
dards, robust legal systems, and impartial law enforcement. To this one
Financial Policies 131could add a number of other features, such as eﬀective corporate gover-
nance and strong payments and settlement systems.
The fact is that ﬁnancial activity takes place within a broad context that
we, in advanced industrial countries, have come to take for granted. The ab-
sence of a stable infrastructure for ﬁnancial transactions has consequences
that can be seen, in their most extreme form, in Russia. However, they were
also an important contributory cause to the problems of Asian economies,
and in Mexico before that.
Accounting is of course a key element. Accounting lapses are the basis of
forbearance. To put it bluntly, they allow bad loans to be classiﬁed as good
right up to the point of failure. The need is for accounting standards that al-
low changes in real economic value to be properly reﬂected in management
accounts and in published income and balance sheet statements. I have no
dispute with Mishkin’s view on this, but it will not be easy to put this simple-
sounding prescription into eﬀect.
Much accounting in banking is done on the basis of historical or book
costs, and for some quite good reasons. It is hard, and judgmental, to assess
a “market” value for a non-marketable asset. Moreover, that value will
change through time (up and down) as the borrowers’ prospects change.
Trying to track the varying value of loan portfolios will introduce greater
volatility into the proﬁtability, and the balance sheets, of banks. To drama-
tize this point, recall that the major U.S. banks would mostly have been in-
solvent on a mark-to-market basis in 1982. The same could probably have
been said about most Japanese banks and insurance companies at various
times in the 1990s. Would their prompt liquidation have added to the sta-
bility of the system?
Still, I am persuaded that a greater focus on market value accounting is
appropriate and probably inevitable. For banks, this would involve provi-
sioning against loans that have not yet become nonperforming. The task
will be to persuade other relevant parties, including the accounting profes-
sion, tax authorities, and securities regulators, all of whom have varying de-
grees of principled reservation about the proposal. Beyond that, we will also
need to deal with the issues created by greater recorded volatility in banks’
balance sheets.
Prudential Supervision
Although I am mentioning this only fourth, improved prudential super-
vision comes ﬁrst in Mishkin’s list, and for understandable reasons. There
can be little dispute about much of what he has to say concerning the need
to ensure the independence and accountability of regulators, to provide ad-
equate resources for supervision, to encourage forward-looking risk man-
agement, and to close troubled institutions. I will not comment further on
these points here.
Rather, I want to make an observation on “prompt corrective action”
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prudential and macroprudential tasks of supervision.
Prompt corrective action is clearly appropriate when a single institution
gets into diﬃculties as a result of misjudgment and poor risk management.
The knowledge that such action will be applied acts as a spur to prudent be-
havior and avoids the compounding of mistakes. But what about a situation
when all institutions get into trouble more or less simultaneously, as a result
of a shared problem? Closing down all institutions may not be an attractive
option, and neither is imposing generalized restraints on incremental lending.
This problem is one manifestation of the diﬃculty of reconciling the mi-
cro and macro aspects of prudential supervision. The quintessential micro-
prudential dictum is that “the ﬁnancial system is sound when each of its
constituent institutions is sound.” At one level, this statement is a truism.
But at another level, it is both too broad and too narrow: too broad because
it is not the failure of individual institutions that is the problem, and too
narrow because it does not recognize adequately endogeneities within the
ﬁnancial system.
The fact is that the problems we are most concerned with are not the re-
sult of idiosyncratic mistakes. More usually, a systemic crisis occurs be-
cause of common exposures to cyclically induced problems. Banks and
their supervisors are reasonably good at assessing relative risks in portfo-
lios. They are less good at capturing undiversiﬁable risks associated with the
economic cycle. So we fall back on risk management paradigms that tell us,
in eﬀect, that risk falls during booms and rises in recessions. Yet we all know
that the worst loans are made in the best times. A more accurate assessment
of underlying risk would be to say that it rises during upswings and materi-
alizes during recessions.
I draw three conclusions from this. First, it is naïve to think that intro-
ducing “best practice” risk assessment will by itself deal with the funda-
mental causes of systemic crisis. Second, although “forbearance” is gener-
ally a mistake, the problem it is designed to solve is real. The real objective
should be to create a situation in which the system is strong enough that for-
bearance is not necessary. Third, we need to think of supervisory instru-
ments that better address the buildup of systemic risk. Possible approaches
include preprovisioning, cyclically adjusted capital requirements, and spe-
cial capital requirements for systemically signiﬁcant institutions. More gen-
erally, a system with multiple channels of ﬁnancial intermediation (espe-
cially, eﬀective capital markets) is more easily able to countenance the
prompt closure of troubled institutions.
Moreover, the actions of individual institutions feed back onto the con-
dition of others. If a large bank fails, its counterparties may be weakened as
a result. In addition, an apparently prudential retrenchment of lending, if
generalized, may indirectly damage the quality of existing credits. In other
words, individually rational behavior can be collectively destabilizing.
Financial Policies 133Restrictions and Controls
The issue of whether capital controls or other restrictions can play a role
in crisis avoidance has made a comeback in recent years. Part of the reason
has been the eﬀects of capital ﬂow volatility in generating recent crises. The
experiences of Malaysia and Chile have also played a role.
My reading of the evidence suggests there is broad consensus that capi-
tal controls are not a desirable long-term feature of the landscape. First,
they limit a country’s access to international capital markets. Second, it is
diﬃcult to distinguish beneﬁcial ﬂows from volatile ones. Third, ﬁnancial
markets generally ﬁnd ways to get around controls. Fourth, controls fre-
quently breed corruption. For all these reasons, the removal of capital ac-
count controls seems to be still a legitimate long-term aspiration.
Yet a number of qualiﬁcations need to be made. First, sequencing is im-
portant. There is now general recognition that to remove controls before the
domestic supervisory structure for the ﬁnancial system is in place is asking
for trouble. Second, measures that serve a genuine prudential purpose have
a legitimate function. Regulatory restraints on mismatching of currency
and maturity fall into this category. Third, measures that restrain inﬂows
are more eﬀective and desirable than those that restrain outﬂows. The ex-
perience of Chile, while not clear-cut, shows that eﬀective inﬂow controls
can be designed. Fourth, and last, “market-friendly” controls do less dam-
age than administrative restrictions. Once again, the Chilean regime can be
cited. It acts as a sliding scale tax on inﬂows, with the highest eﬀective tax
being levied on the shortest-term inﬂows.
Codes and Standards
In discussing these various aspects of the ﬁnancial system that are im-
portant in helping avoid crises, I have so far said nothing about howthe sug-
gested improvements are to be brought about. It is worth noting, however,
that the international community now has a strategy for achieving this. It
revolves around the articulation and implementation of codes and stan-
dards of best practice in the ﬁnancial area.
It is easy to poke fun at the fact that there are now sixty-six standards on
the website of the Financial Stability Forum. But, sarcasm aside, this is
simply a reﬂection of the complexity of a well-functioning ﬁnancial system.
It needs not just sound management of the variety of diﬀerent intermedi-
aries in the system, but eﬀective transparency, corporate governance, pay-
ment and settlement systems, accounting practices, and so on. Certainly,
the sixty-six standards call for prioritization and sequencing, and countries
committed to introducing them will need help. But those that criticize the
sheer number of standards would be more convincing if they showed more
evidence they were aware of their content.
How are standards to be drawn up and implemented? The strategy calls
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perts (the Basel Committee is the best example), then for implementation to
be encouraged through oﬃcial assessment and market forces.
So far, the strategy is not much more than that—a strategy. Filling in the
details will be laborious and time-consuming. However, I believe it presents
the best hope of the goal that this conference is designed to promote: help-
ing reduce the incidence and severity of future ﬁnancial crises.
3. Michael P. Dooley
When Martin Feldstein asked me to participate in this session, he asked that
I draw on my experience at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the Federal Reserve. I’ve been an academic for nine years now but will try
to lean more on experience than theory in commenting on the issues raised
in this morning’s discussion and in Frederic S. Mishkin’s excellent paper.
I believe that a quite new and important element has inﬂuenced recent
discussions of exchange rate regimes for emerging markets. What I would
call the political economy approach is based on the idea that exchange rate
regimes create incentives both for the private sector and for the central
bank. This approach is very hostile to the “middle” because managed
regimes become adjustable pegs and, in practice, have created very bad in-
centives for central bankers and private investors in emerging markets. All
three central bankers emphasized this point this morning, and I think we
need to consider this point of view very carefully.
I will focus on one incentive problem, namely, the association between
banking crises and exchange rate regimes. In particular, I think we need to
ask why repressed ﬁnancial systems in emerging markets that were so stable
for so long, suddenly become a source of vulnerability for currencies.
The historical evidence suggests that repressed banking systems have
been stable as long as they remained repressed. Before liberalization, resi-
dents of emerging markets had no choice but to keep their money at home,
and repressed banking systems “worked” from a macroeconomic point of
view. From a micro point of view, however, they were terribly ineﬃcient. Re-
pressed banking systems are characterized by assets that have little or no
market value. This is no secret. Every IMF report on such countries had a
standard paragraph warning that losses in the domestic banking system
were a threat to the solvency of the banks and the government. Yet the pre-
dicted run on the banks never materialized, and governments became less
and less likely to pay attention to such warnings.
The key to this puzzle is, I think, that repressed banking systems are sim-
ilar to pay-as-you-go pension schemes. As long as each generation expects
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sets is not crucial for the value of banks’ liabilities. Liberalization of the ﬁ-
nancial system allows the next generation to buy alternative foreign or do-
mestic assets, breaking this chain. As soon as liberalization becomes a sure
thing, the repressed banking system is doomed.
But it does not go quietly. As Mishkin explains in his paper, banks that
have lost their franchise value reach for risk. Liberalization also provides a
much larger international market for banks’ liabilities, and this makes an
all-or-nothing play proﬁtable. Finally, the regulatory structure needed to
blunt these incentives is not likely to develop overnight.
Why do nonresidents lend? My guess is that the exchange rate regime has
contributed to the expectation that their investments in these exploding
banking systems are insured by governments. Prior to liberalization, par-
ticularly in Asia but also in other emerging markets, governments accumu-
lated reserves in order to stabilize nominal exchange rates. This search for
security has had the unintended eﬀect of creating of a very well funded
lender of last resort that does not know how to regulate a banking system
in an open economy. The result in my view is a capital inﬂow that is unre-
lated to the quality of the investments in the emerging market. The capital
inﬂow is related to bank’s incentives to reach for risk and nonresident in-
vestors’ incentives to take advantage of a substantial insurance fund. A ﬁ-
nancial or exchange market crisis is the natural result of these incentives.
This story is quite simple and should leave its tracks in the data. Inseok
Shin and I have taken a careful look at the events leading up to the recent
crisis in Korea (Dooley and Shin 2000). We document a clear deterioration
in the equity value of Korean banks after 1991, following liberalization. In
spite of this, foreign deposits grew rapidly and, in fact, grew more rapidly in
individual banks that were known to have the weakest balance sheets. There
was also an obvious deterioration in the quality of banks’ assets during this
rapid growth. We conclude that foreign investors must have been comforted
by the expectation that the Korean government would use its reserves and
lines of credit to bail them out; and our reading of events following the cri-
sis is that those expectations were largely justiﬁed. The Bank of Korea de-
posited $20 billion in oﬀshore branches of Korean banks and $10 billion in
domestic branches. To be sure, not all foreign investors in Korea were bailed
out, but that is not important for our story. Those who took uninsured risks
received very high rates of return before the crisis.
What can we conclude about the political economy of exchange rate
regimes? I think Arminio Fraga hit the nail right on the head this morning
when he argued that the traditional arguments about ﬁxed versus ﬂoating
may someday be relevant for emerging markets but are not crucial now. In
virtually every case, emerging markets drag behind a banking system with
such a large hole in the balance sheet that it is politically diﬃcult for the gov-
ernment to clean it up by recognizing and the socializing the loss. This gen-
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a ﬁxed exchange rate and reserves as a guarantee for its balance sheets, and
for the government, which will be tempted to accumulate reserves and grow
out of debt with an undervalued exchange rate. Greater exchange rate ﬂex-
ibility will not cure the problem in the banking system, but it will eliminate
the most obvious way for the private sector to make matters worse.
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4. Montek S. Ahluwalia
I would like to join the other panelists in complimenting Frederic Mishkin
on an excellent paper. The twelve areas of ﬁnancial policy he has identiﬁed
reﬂect the current international consensus on how to avoid ﬁnancial crises,
and most developing countries are moving broadly in the directions indi-
cated. Martin Feldstein has asked me to comment on the paper from the In-
dian perspective, so I will focus on how India’s ﬁnancial policies measure
up against the template provided in the Mishkin paper.
A few words on recent economic developments in India may be useful by
way of background information. India experienced a severe foreign ex-
change crisis in 1991, which led to the adoption of a program of economic
stabilization and structural reforms. The reforms were similar to those at-
tempted by several other countries and involved a basic reorientation of
economic policy toward economic liberalization and greater integration
with the global economy. They were broad based, in the sense of covering
several areas such as industrial policy, trade policy, price decontrol, foreign
investment policy, and ﬁnancial liberalization. However, the pace of re-
forms in India was much more gradualist than in most other countries, re-
ﬂecting the diﬃculty in generating a political consensus in a large and
highly pluralist democracy. The slow pace has taxed the patience of many
otherwise sympathetic observers, but it is important to note that the re-
forms have yielded positive results. The economy stabilized very quickly af-
ter the crisis of 1991, and the average growth in the postreforms period
1992–2000 was about 6.5 percent, making India one of the ﬁve or six fastest-
growing countries in this period.
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position in 1991, when it was overcome by a crisis, to the much stronger po-
sition in 1997 and 1998 when it was able to escape the East Asian contagion.
It is relevant to ask how far this was due to India’s policies having been
brought in line with the prescriptions of the Mishkin paper, and I hope I can
throw some light on this question.
Prudential Norms and Supervision
Reforms in the banking sector were an integral part of India’s reform pro-
gram, and some steps were taken even before the East Asian crisis to im-
prove prudential norms and to strengthen supervision. The process ac-
quired a new urgency after East Asia, when ﬁnancial-sector weaknesses
came to be seen as one of the principal causes of crises in emerging markets
and there was a growing consensus that prudential norms and supervision
standards should be raised to internationally accepted levels.
There has been a signiﬁcant improvement in capital adequacy require-
ments and prudential norms in recent years. Banks are currently expected
to maintain a minimum ratio of capital to risk assets of 9 percent, and this
is expected to be increased to 10 percent in the near future. The norms for
income recognition, classiﬁcation of nonperforming assets, and provision-
ing have also been tightened. However, since international norms are being
implemented in a phased manner, Indian norms remain below the Basel
Committee’s minimum standards in some important respects. Loans are
classiﬁed as substandard only when debt service payments become overdue
for 180 days, whereas the international norm is 90 days. The extent of pro-
visioning for diﬀerent categories of assets is also below the international
level. The ultimate objective is to align the norms with international levels,
but a ﬁrm deadline has not been speciﬁed.
A number of steps have also been taken to improve accounting standards
and disclosure by the banks and to strengthen supervision. Traditional on-
site supervision is being supplemented by a system of oﬀsite supervision
based on a regular ﬂow of information from the banks and this is expected
to allow closer and more continuous monitoring of asset quality, capital ad-
equacy, large exposures, connected lending, and so on.
The need to strengthen regulation by establishing a system for prompt
corrective action, which is speciﬁcally mentioned in the Mishkin paper, has
been recognized. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has circulated a discus-
sion paper on this subject, proposing a system that establishes objective
trigger points in three diﬀerent dimensions of bank performance—capital
adequacy, percentage of nonperforming assets, and return on assets. If a
bank’s performance in any dimension deteriorates to a deﬁned trigger
point, it will automatically invite a set of mandatory actions by RBI. In ad-
dition, there are certain types of discretionary action that may be taken to
improve performance. Implementation of this system will deﬁnitely im-
prove the quality of supervision.
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pervisory systems, but this does not automatically ensure an improvement
in the functioning of banks. That requires institutional changes in the in-
ternal functioning of banks, including especially improvements in the sys-
tems of credit evaluation and risk assessment, the quality of human re-
sources, and the quality of internal controls and governance. These changes
can only be achieved over a period of time. I fully agree with the speaker
who said that even after we decide to go down this route, it may take ten
years to get there! This is especially so when reforms are being introduced
in a noncrisis environment, where the need for change may not be evident
to all concerned.1
This is well illustrated by the position regarding capital adequacy in the
Indian banking system. At present, 97 out of the 101 banks operating in In-
dia are above the 9 percent minimum level of capital to risk-weighted assets.
However, an independent credit rating agency has pointed out that the po-
sition would look much less comfortable if the norms for classifying loans
as substandard were immediately set at international levels and provisions
had to be made accordingly. The problem would be further aggravated if the
banks followed international practice in making provisions wherever loans
are expected to deteriorate based on recent trends. The study found that
most banks might fall below the 9 percent minimum.
The dilemma facing the regulatory authority is evident. A faster transi-
tion to international norms would have pushed many more banks below the
accepted capital adequacy level, eﬀectively restricting their ability to ex-
pand credit and possibly having a contractionary impact on economic ac-
tivity. However, it would have strengthened the banking system faster. All
banks would have been under greater pressure to improve performance,
and the better capitalized and more eﬃcient banks would have gained mar-
ket share relative to the weaker banks.
A peculiar feature of the Indian experience is that the beneﬁts expected
from better norms in terms of improved lending quality may be greatly re-
duced because the macroeconomic environment is characterized by a high
ﬁscal deﬁcit.2 The high deﬁcit has produced high interest rates and has had
the expected adverse selection consequence of discouraging high-quality
low-risk borrowers. The crowding-out on the side of demand for credit is re-
inforced on the supply side by the fact that banks have to meet high capital
adequacy requirements for commercial assets whereas government securi-
ties are treated as zero risk assets, which creates a strong regulatory incen-
Financial Policies 139
1. A ﬁnancial crisis, with a visible collapse of some ﬁnancial institutions, creates a sense of
urgency about the need for restructuring, and the process is facilitated if failed institutions are
taken over by foreign banks with large-scale replacement of management systems and changes
of senior personnel.
2. The need to reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit was recognized as a priority objective from the very
beginning of the reforms, but progress in this area has been disappointing, and the consoli-
dated deﬁcit of the central and state governments is almost 10 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct—about the same as just before the 1991 crisis.tive for investing in government securities. The net result is that banks are
encouraged to invest in government securities, eﬀectively crowding out
bank credit to the private sector. The fact that Indian banks hold substan-
tial volumes of government securities contributes to the ﬁnancial stability
of the system, but only at the cost of crowding out credit to the private sec-
tor, with a resulting loss in eﬃciency.
Reducing Government Ownership of Banks
The area in which India’s ﬁnancial policies diﬀer most distinctly from the
international consensus relates to the role of public ownership of the bank-
ing system. The mainstream view, reﬂected in the Mishkin paper, is that
government ownership of ﬁnancial institutions is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with sound banking and the role of government should therefore be
drastically reduced, if not completely eliminated. However, public-sector
banks account for 82 percent of the total assets of the banking system in In-
dia, and privatization is not on the agenda.
Government policy toward public ownership is being modiﬁed to allow
public-sector banks to raise equity capital from the market, but this dilution
is being driven not by the desire to reduce the government’s role in man-
agement but by the desire to meet capital adequacy requirements without
having to provide capital from the budget. Initially, the reforms permitted
dilution provided government equity remained at least 51 percent. More re-
cently, the government has announced its intention to reduce its sharehold-
ing to a minority position (33 percent) in order to meet the additional cap-
ital needs of the banks, but it has also stated that although the government’s
shareholding will be reduced to a minority position, the “public-sector
character” of the banking system will be maintained. The exact meaning of
this phrase has not been clariﬁed, but it clearly implies that government will
remain signiﬁcantly involved in management.
Skeptics doubt whether any signiﬁcant improvement can be achieved as
long as the government remains the largest single (albeit minority) owner,
with the rest of the equity dispersed over a large number of shareholders.
There are also doubts about whether suﬃcient private equity could be at-
tracted to recapitalize the banks on these terms, because the shares issued
by the public-sector banks in the ﬁrst stage of equity dilution are currently
trading at a substantial discount on the issue price. However, the political
resistance to privatization of the banking system is very strong.3 In this sit-
uation, the best that can be expected is that reducing government equity to
a minority position would enable the government to give bank manage-
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3. Part of the problem is rooted in historical experience with private-sector banking, before
the nationalization of the major banks in 1969. The banks were seen as captive banks of in-
dustrial houses with a great deal of connected lending. Lending to agriculture and small en-
terprises was minimal. The experience of privatization of the banks in many developing coun-
tries in the past twenty years is also not particularly encouraging.ments a degree of ﬂexibility and autonomy that would substantially im-
prove their functioning.
It is diﬃcult to judge how much autonomy is really possible. Reducing
government equity to a minority will certainly enable the government to
free the banks from many of the cumbersome rules and procedures that are
otherwise automatically applied to any institution in which the government
has more than 50 percent equity. They could be given much greater ﬂexibil-
ity in hiring and promotion, and their salary structure could be delinked
from the salary structure of the government and the rest of the public sec-
tor. In principle, the public-sector banks could be allowed to function as
board-managed institutions, in which the board would include some gov-
ernment representatives but would also include independent, profession-
ally competent persons to represent private shareholders. It has been ar-
gued that if the top management team in such banks is appointed by the
board, and not by the government as at present, the banks could achieve a
signiﬁcantly higher degree of management autonomy, and therefore of eﬃ-
ciency, even if it is less than is possible in a fully private-sector bank.
Whatever happens to the public-sector banks, India’s financial reforms
will definitely reduce the dominance of the banking sector by the public-
sector banks because the private-sector segment (consisting of Indian
private-sector banks and foreign banks) is likely to expand very rapidly.
An essential part of banking reforms was the grant of banking licenses to
new Indian private-sector banks and a more liberal policy for expansion
of branches of foreign banks. As a result, the share of the private-sector
segment in total assets of the banking system, which was only 8 percent in
1990–91, increased to 18 percent in 1999–2000. The new private-sector
banks and the foreign banks do not have as large a branch network as the
public-sector banks, but they have other competitive advantages: they are
less burdened with excess staﬀ, have a high degree of managerial and op-
erational flexibility, and are adopting information technology much more
rapidly, enabling them to oﬀer better services and also a wider range of
products. Besides, the advantages of a very large network of brick and
mortar branches are likely to diminish over time as information technol-
ogy makes it possible to access quality clients without a larger number of
branches. With continued financial liberalization, the share of the
private-sector segment could easily expand to 30 percent over the next
five years.
Competition from eﬃcient private-sector banks and foreign banks will
put pressure on the public-sector banks to improve their performance, and
the stronger public-sector banks can achieve much higher levels of eﬃ-
ciency if given operational ﬂexibility. There is some evidence that they are
making an eﬀort. Several banks have attempted to reduce excess staﬀ by
oﬀering generous voluntary retirement packages. Although strongly op-
posed by the unions, this initiative has received a very positive response,
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cost saving could be achieved by closing down loss-making branches, which
have tended to proliferate. Reduction in government equity to a minority
position will make it easier for the government to allow bank managements
to explore these options without having the issues politicized.
The real challenge will be how to deal with the weak public-sector banks,
which will be squeezed between the private-sector banks, which are ex-
panding market share, and the stronger public-sector banks, which will
ﬁght to maintain their share. Several public-sector banks have been identi-
ﬁed as being weak on the basis of capital adequacy and various eﬃciency-
related criteria. Of these, three were identiﬁed as the weakest, calling for one
of three options: (a) closure or merger with another public-sector bank, (b)
change of ownership (i.e., privatization), or (c) comprehensive restructur-
ing with a one-time cleanup of the balance sheet and continued operation
as a public-sector bank. The government has ruled out the ﬁrst two options
and indicated that it will recapitalize these banks, provided a restructuring
plan is drawn up by the banks’ managements that is acceptable to the gov-
ernment and the RBI.
The credibility of this approach depends upon the extent of restructuring
and cost reduction that can be brought about. There will have to be a sub-
stantial reduction in staﬀ, possible acceptance of a freeze on wages, and also
closure of a suﬃcient number of loss-making branches to create a smaller,
leaner bank, which could become proﬁtable. Without radical restructuring
it will be diﬃcult for these banks to survive in the more competitive envi-
ronment they are likely to face in future.
The worst outcome for the future of public-sector banks would be one in
which regulatory forbearance—always a danger when there are public-
sector banks—allows these banks to continue to operate despite inade-
quate capital and without any signiﬁcant restructuring. If closure or re-
structuring and privatization is not found to be politically acceptable, the
regulatory system should at least insist on compliance with capital ade-
quacy norms so that banks that fail to perform become “narrow banks,”
functioning as deposit-taking institutions investing mainly in government
securities, which does not require a strong capital base and does not pose
any threat to ﬁnancial stability. This would at least allow more eﬃcient
banks (both public-sector and private-sector banks) to expand and ﬁll the
space vacated by the weak banks, sending the right signal to other banks for
the future.
The Indian banking system is also burdened with another feature that is
not in line with mainstream views on good banking, although it exists in
other countries also in one form or another. This is the practice of directed
credit. All Indian banks are required to ensure that 40 percent of their loans
and advances portfolio is directed towards what is called the “priority sec-
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like. Banks are not directed to lend to speciﬁc borrowers, but only to ensure
suﬃcient allocation of funds to broadly deﬁned sectors, and the banks are
expected to use normal credit assessment criteria to identify creditworthy
borrowers within these sectors. However, this is clearly a quasiﬁscal activ-
ity. A large portion of priority-sector lending is to small farmers and mi-
croenterprises, and the interest rate for these loans is capped at the prime
lending rate, which implies a signiﬁcant subsidy, given the high administra-
tive costs and higher default risk of such loans. Strict adherence to sound
banking principles calls for a removal of quasiﬁscal burdens. If subsidies
have to be given, they should be given explicitly through the budget, a pro-
cess that would automatically be subject to demands for scrutiny, trans-
parency, and, most of all, eﬀectiveness.
Legal and Judicial Issues
The legal and judicial system, which is listed as one of the twelve critical
areas, is indeed a major problem area for banks in India, as in many emerg-
ing market countries. Indian banks are greatly hampered by legal proce-
dures that make it diﬃcult to attach collateral (especially real estate) and re-
alize its sale value. The procedures regarding bankruptcy are also extremely
cumbersome, and liquidation of insolvent companies can take several years.
This is undoubtedly one of the principal reasons for the relatively high level
of nonperforming assets in the banking system.
The government initially sought to deal with the problem by establishing
specialized Debt Recovery Tribunals designed to enable banks to take ac-
tion for debt recovery within the existing laws through specialized courts
empowered to use simpler procedures. This has helped to some extent, but
the real lacuna is the lack of a modern bankruptcy law that would represent
an appropriate balance between the rights of debtors and creditors and
would allow creditors to force liquidation in the event of default after giv-
ing debtors a reasonable time to ﬁnd a mutually acceptable solution. The
government has announced its intention to amend the existing legislation
along these lines, and this would represent a major improvement in the sit-
uation.
Capital Controls
India’s policy toward capital controls diﬀers from the view advocated in
the paper that controls on capital movement are not only ineﬃcient but also
infeasible in the longer run because of leakages and therefore should be
avoided. This was also the view advocated by the IMF before the East Asian
crisis, but its approach has become more nuanced since then. Free mobility
of capital is still regarded as a ﬁrst best policy, but the IMF now recognizes
that it may be risky to move to full capital mobility until the ﬁnancial sec-
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Jagdish Bhagwati (1998) and John Williamson (1992), holds that although
there may be eﬃciency gains from liberalizing capital movements, the ben-
eﬁts are small and also uncertain. Bhagwati has argued that whereas there
is a very strong empirical basis for asserting signiﬁcant beneﬁts from liber-
alization of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), there is much less ev-
idence of similar beneﬁts from liberalization of capital movements gener-
ally. On this view, emerging market countries should liberalize inﬂows of
FDI, but they should continue to be cautious in liberalizing other capital
ﬂows. It is sometimes argued that full capital mobility is necessary to enable
countries to attract much-needed FDI. This argument is not particularly
convincing because China does not allow full capital mobility and yet is
clearly the most successful country in attracting FDI. Foreign investors
clearly need the assurance of being able to repatriate their capital at will, but
full capital mobility may not be necessary.
India’s policies are in line with the Bhagwati-Williamson prescriptions.
Both FDI and portfolio investment in Indian stock markets have been
greatly liberalized, and these investors are also allowed to liquidate their in-
vestments and exit at will. Debt ﬂows, on the other hand, are strictly con-
trolled. Borrowing abroad requires government permission, and the system
is managed to ensure that total foreign borrowing in any year stays within
some predetermined “prudent” level. Furthermore, there are minimum ma-
turity requirements that rule out short-term borrowing, except for normal
trade credit.
This policy paid dividends at the time of the East Asian crisis because In-
dia’s external debt indicators had improved considerably compared to the
situation in 1991, and this was surely one factor explaining why India did
not suﬀer from contagion. Most important, India’s short-term foreign debt
was only 25 percent of total foreign exchange reserves, compared with well
over 100 percent for some of the crisis-hit countries. This made India much
less vulnerable to a cessation of commercial bank lending, which was the
principal cause of the massive reversal of capital ﬂows in East Asia.
India’s capital control regime not only restricts short-term capital inﬂows
but also controls capital outﬂows by Indian residents. Although residents
can obtain foreign exchange to make payments abroad for all current trans-
actions, they are not allowed to transfer funds abroad for capital transac-
tions other than for repayment of external debt. In recent years, the system
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4. It is interesting to note that the IMF position is somewhat asymmetric, because countries
that have liberalized the capital account but do not have strong ﬁnancial systems are not be-
ing advised to reimpose controls. This would be understandable if ﬁnancial systems could be
strengthened very quickly, but as we have seen this is not a practical possibility. If strengthen-
ing the ﬁnancial systems is indeed a process that could take ten years, then there is a case for
considering whether countries that have liberalized capital controls prematurely should not
reimpose some form of control. However, there are no takers for this point of view in the fund.has operated more liberally to allow Indian ﬁrms to create or acquire pro-
duction or marketing capacity abroad as part of the ﬁrm’s global expansion
plans or in support of an export drive. However, the transfer of funds from
India to hold ﬁnancial assets abroad as an act of portfolio diversiﬁcation is
not allowed.
The original rationale for controlling capital outﬂows was that it will in-
crease the resources available for investment domestically, and this was per-
haps justiﬁable at a time when foreign investment was not welcome and cap-
ital controls were seen as a way to maximize the availability of resources for
domestic investment. With foreign investment now welcome, this argument
is no longer applicable, since any capital outﬂow for investment abroad only
vacates investment space at home, which in principle could be ﬁlled by for-
eign investment provided productive investment opportunities exist. In
other words, the liberalizing of capital controls need not reduce the total
level of investment but may only alter its composition, with foreign in-
vestors acquiring domestic assets while domestic residents diversify their
portfolio by investing abroad.
Indian policymakers are also keen to retain controls on capital outﬂows
for another reason. In the absence of capital controls it is feared that a spec-
ulative attack on the currency could create expectations of devaluation that
might trigger capital ﬂight, which would prove self-fulﬁlling. It is of course
recognized that controls are porous and signiﬁcant leakages take place over
time, but it is felt that controls can be eﬀective in preventing sudden out-
ﬂows in a crisis situation. This is not to say that capital outﬂows should not
be allowed under any circumstances. On the contrary, it is argued that the
existing system can be operated to achieve whatever level of capital outﬂow
is felt to be manageable in normal times, but the system of controls should
be retained so that a sudden outﬂow can be prevented.
India is likely to continue with its present cautious policy on capital con-
trols, and a measure of caution in this area is perhaps justiﬁed on sequenc-
ing grounds. It would be better to get the ﬁscal deﬁcit under control and
have more progress on ﬁnancial reforms before liberalizing the capital ac-
count. However, there can be little doubt that the compulsions of global-
ization will inevitably push India toward allowing greater ﬂexibility. Indian
ﬁrms will certainly need much greater freedom to invest abroad. Foreign in-
vestors locating production facilities in India will also demand greater free-
dom. At present, they have full freedom to take out their investment and
exit at will, but they are subject to the same restrictions in their day-to-day
operations that apply to other Indian companies (e.g., they cannot borrow
abroad without permission, and such borrowings must conform to mini-
mum maturity requirements even if they are from the parent company to its
subsidiary in India). They are likely to demand ﬂexibility for capital trans-
actions comparable to that available in other countries. As the ﬁnancial sec-
tor deepens, there will also be demands from institutions such as mutual
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some foreign assets.
India is likely to respond to these pressures by loosening existing restric-
tions in steps as it gains conﬁdence in how to handle macroeconomic shocks
in an open economy. However, as capital ﬂows are liberalized, India’s vul-
nerability on this account will also increase, and with it the compulsion to
bring other ﬁnancial policies in line with the requirements of crisis preven-
tion.
Exchange Rate Policies
On exchange rate policies, India’s practice compares well with the ﬂex-
ible exchange rate approach recommended in the Mishkin paper. The RBI
has stated on many occasions that the exchange rate will be determined by
market fundamentals (which it has been careful not to deﬁne), and there is
certainly no commitment to maintaining a particular exchange rate. Past
experience shows that the rupee has depreciated steadily against the U.S.
dollar (around 5 percent per year for the period 1996–2000), and no rea-
sonable investor would have any grounds for believing that there is any kind
of implicit exchange guarantee.
The exchange rate regime is not a completely free ﬂoat in which the au-
thorities abstain from any intervention, nor can this be expected, given the
thinness of the foreign exchange market. The Reserve Bank intervenes (ei-
ther through direct intervention in foreign exchange markets or through in-
terest rate interventions) whenever it feels that the movement of the rupee
is being driven by “temporary imbalances of demand and supply” or by
“speculative pressure.” It is of course diﬃcult to tell whether a movement at
any particular time reﬂects these factors or a change in fundamentals, and
this judgment necessarily must be left to the RBI. However, it is clear that
the RBI’s interventions are in the nature of “leaning against the wind” to
calm markets, rather than ﬁghting against all odds to maintain a particular
rate.
The RBI has been criticized for asymmetric behavior because it is seen to
ﬁght much harder to prevent a nominal appreciation of the rupee than a de-
preciation. This happened during the period 1994 to 1996, when there were
substantial inﬂows of portfolio capital. The rupee would have appreciated
vis-à-vis the dollar if left to market forces, but this was eﬀectively prevented
by the RBI’s active intervention, which led to a substantial buildup of for-
eign exchange reserves. In retrospect, the RBI’s action seems entirely justi-
ﬁed. The buildup of reserves cannot be said to have been excessive, espe-
cially in the light of the East Asian crisis and the increased importance now
accorded to maintaining high levels of reserves. Besides, the resistance to an
appreciation in the nominal rate in that period also seems justiﬁed since the
real eﬀective exchange rate (REER) had already appreciated because the
rupee was stable against the dollar, which had appreciated against other
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only have worsened the situation. Because the inﬂation rate in India ex-
ceeded the inﬂation rate in its major trading partners by 3 to 4 percent per
year in this period, maintenance of the REER required a nominal depreci-
ation, not appreciation.
The relevance of the REER as a guide for exchange rate policy in India
has varied. In certain periods, especially 1994–96, the objective of stabiliz-
ing the REER was oﬃcially stated on several occasions but the RBI never
oﬃcially adopted an announced REER target. More recently, the RBI has
described the REER as only one of the many factors that are relevant in de-
termining what the exchange rate should be. This “constructive ambiguity”
is perhaps unavoidable when operating a managed ﬂoating exchange rate
regime.
India’s exchange rate policies certainly helped to avoid problems that
aﬀected many other countries at the time of the East Asian crisis. The rupee
came under pressure on several occasions in 1998, but the absence of a rigid
exchange rate target meant that it was able to adjust in a series of small steps
without attracting much criticism from foreign investors, including portfo-
lio investors. Between June 1997 and October 2000 the rupee depreciated
against the dollar by around 23 percent, which was about half of the depre-
ciation in Thailand and Malaysia and only a little lower than Korea (which
rebounded strongly in 2000). At no stage, however, did India look as if it was
facing a currency crisis.
The logical development of exchange rate policy in future would be to
learn to allow greater exchange rate ﬂexibility with less frequent interven-
tion by the RBI. The need for such ﬂexibility will undoubtedly increase as
capital controls are progressively liberalized, increasing the possible pres-
sure in foreign exchange markets from this source. The fact that import
tariﬀs are still high, and the government has indicated that they will be low-
ered to East Asian levels in the medium term, suggests that there must be
room for compensating depreciation to accompany tariﬀ reductions. This
adjustment would be much easier to achieve in a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime.
One consequence of allowing greater ﬂexibility in the exchange rate is
that the need for hedging instruments will expand. This in turn will put pres-
sure on the system to liberalize capital transactions, because it is not pos-
sible to develop an eﬃcient market for hedging foreign exchange risk with
the restrictive capital controls. Banks in particular will have to be given
more ﬂexibility to take positions in forward markets subject to reasonable
risk limitations.
To summarize, India’s ﬁnancial policies are moving in the direction indi-
cated in the Mishkin paper in many respects, but important gaps remain in
some areas. Some of these gaps, especially those relating to prudential
norms, will be closed in a phased manner. There are important diﬀerences
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the ﬁnancial system and the policy toward capital controls. Some of these
diﬀerences (e.g., on capital controls) can be justiﬁed on sequencing
grounds. On the whole, policies are converging toward those that are cur-
rently seen to be necessary to avoid ﬁnancial crises.
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Discussion Summary
Sebastian Edwards stressed the importance of distinguishing between con-
trols on capital inﬂows and controls on capital outﬂows. The Chilean expe-
rience with its controls, which are market-based and designed to deter
short-run inﬂows, has been largely positive. He said that the controls oper-
ated like a tax—which was as high as 600 basis points for short-term
ﬂows—and thus shifted the composition of ﬂows toward the longer end.
Edwards went on, however, to say that the success of the Chilean ﬂows had
been oversold. Chile was signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the Asian and Russian
crises. Thus, he said, certain things needed to be kept in mind when judging
the eﬀectiveness of Chilean-type controls. First, they are a temporary solu-
tion and must be abandoned at some point. Chile has already abandoned its
controls. Second, they can lead to complacency. Edwards gave the example
of Korea in 1997, where the existence of controls led international investors
to downplay the poor shape of the banking system.
On the relative merits of inﬂow and outﬂow controls, Jacob Frenkel
thinks there is nothing to debate. There is a consensus, he said, that if you
control outﬂows, inﬂows will not come. He agreed with Edwards that the
Chilean success with inﬂow controls is oversold, remarking that the
Chileans did not abandon their controls because they worked so well. He
also agreed with Michael P. Dooley that problems are not exposed until you
are part of the “stormy ocean” of global capital markets. But this does not
mean that robustness is enhanced if you are sheltered by controls. Rather, it
means that the distortions are there, and when corrections take place they
do so “in a very noisy way.” Turning to an example of how the business sec-
148 Discussion Summarytor will self-insure in more turbulent markets, he pointed out that, prior to
the removal of foreign exchange controls in Israel, there were practically no
transactions in the nonspot foreign exchange market. Within a short period
after the removal of controls, 40 percent of transactions were in the nonspot
market, as the businesses began hedging against exchange rate risk.
Montek S. Ahluwaliaagreed with Frenkel’s point that you can’t have con-
trols on outﬂows unless you are willing to give up any hope of inﬂows. In In-
dia’s case, inﬂows are welcomed and repatriation is allowed. The preoccu-
pation in India is with controlling outﬂows by domestic residents. The
authorities know that steady leakage will occur as people try to avoid ex-
cessive regulation. But a regime that controls outﬂows by domestic resi-
dents prevents sudden ﬂights, so that it is not possible for several billion dol-
lars to leave in one week. He said that this belief holds them back in
liberalizing outﬂows. Another problem with the diﬀerential treatment of
domestic and foreign investors is that the ease of exit of the latter creates
more volatility for the former. But domestic investors don’t have the instru-
ments to hedge against this volatility, because the hedging markets do not
exist and will only exist when the capital market is opened up. One solution
would be Chilean-style controls applying to outﬂows. This could be done
symmetrically—everybody is entitled to exit, but based on unremunerated
deposits for one year. This might be politically feasible because domestic
regulatory authorities are mostly afraid of short-term outﬂows.
Stanley Fischersaid the International Monetary Fund has not supported
the removal of controls until there are signs of ﬁnancial strengthening. On
reimposing controls when the system is weak, he agreed that is diﬃcult
short of a major crisis. On inﬂow controls, he said Chile is not the only
country to have used them. They have been used in other countries—for ex-
ample, Brazil and Columbia—and the empirical results have been more en-
couraging than the critics have allowed. These results show that the pres-
ence of controls does not aﬀect the overall level of inﬂows, but they alter
their composition, moving them to the long end. Turning to measures to
strengthen the ﬁnancial system, he said he agrees with most of what An-
drew Crockett said, but he doesn’t agree that it takes ten years and thus con-
trols have to be in place for ten years. He said that the incentive eﬀects might
be such that you will ﬁx the system less rapidly if controls are in, but that
still does not mean that you need ten years to do it.
John Crowsaid that, like Mexico, Canada adopted a ﬂoating rate because
of the infeasibility of controls given its proximity to the United States. He
also agreed with the concern that controls would turn into an excuse for de-
laying ﬁnancial-sector reform.
Karen Johnson expressed concern about the way risk management is ad-
dressed. Too much focus is placed on the liability side to the neglect of the
asset side. We should really talk about “portfolio management” rather than
“liability management,” recognizing that every country has assets as well as
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issues are compartmentalized: banking regulations, ﬁscal policy norms,
monetary policy norms, and so on. The relevant issues are allocated to
diﬀerent parts of the public or private sectors to take care of, again ignor-
ing important covariances. She added that what she is advocating is a mon-
umental task—“we don’t have a government bureau of risk management,”
she said—but some progress needs to be made in getting away from think-
ing of the various elements as separable issues.
Mervyn King drew an analogy between the discussion of “corner solu-
tions” for exchange rate regimes and such solutions for capital controls.
Capital controls might provide temptations to follow suboptimal policies,
he said, but added: “if you leap naked into this world of free capital move-
ments, you may need superoptimal policies to avoid the sorts of crises that
have hit countries.” The “middle ground” puts enormous pressure on the
quality of policy making, he said, adding that it is not a trivial task to
strengthen ﬁnancial systems and implement better banking supervision. As
evidence, he pointed to the experience of banking crises in the industrial-
ized countries over the last 200 to 300 years. He said that the industrial
countries still did not deal with these crises very well. The Group of Ten
(G10) has collectively spent vast sums of money bailing out their own ﬁ-
nancial systems, and he added that if he were in Ahluwalia’s position, he
would be cautious about the speed at which to proceed in this area.
Staying with problems in the G10, King pointed out that creditors are
also subject to moral hazard created by the G10 governments themselves.
Those who ﬁnance the banking ﬂows into emerging markets are often to-
tally unaware of the risks being taken. The reason they can ignore the risks
is that industrial country governments underwrite them. He agrees with
Fischer that this does not mean that you can easily reimpose capital con-
trols, but it does suggest some natural caution in removing controls when
the costs of getting it wrong are expensive crises.
Anne O. Krueger advised Ahluwalia to push for ﬁnancial strengthening,
and if opening up the capital market forces this, she would “push it even
harder.” Drawing on the Korean experience, she stressed that the argument
for ﬁnancial strengthening is primarily a growth argument. Although Ko-
rea had a very high return on capital in the 1960s (a real rate of return of 37
percent per year), in later years the ﬁnancial system severely misallocated
capital through such mechanisms as the evergreening of accounts. Given
the importance of the banking system in countries that haven’t developed
other ﬁnancial markets, it is crucial that banks move capital to where it has
a high rate of return, and this requires banking-sector reform. In India ﬁs-
cal deﬁcits also draw crucial funds away from real investment. Krueger con-
cluded by reiterating that ﬁnancial strengthening and ﬁscal control are
long-run growth issues as well as crisis prevention issues.
150 Discussion SummaryPeter Garber addressed a trade-oﬀ inherent in mark-to-market account-
ing practices. Previously banks didn’t mark to market so as not to impose
severe liquidity problems on borrowers. But the practice of carrying bor-
rowers for a long time led to enormous problems when the system eventu-
ally broke down. Although the new trend toward marking to market might
prevent major solvency problems, it makes liquidity problems much more
frequent. This can be good to the extent it heads oﬀ insolvencies, but some
hold the view that liquidity problems cause insolvencies by creating “mul-
tiple equilibria,” and so it might not be desirable to “impose these liquidity-
hungry methodologies on emerging market countries.” Regarding the issue
of subordinated debt, Garber believes that such requirements are highly
manipulable. Banks can enter the market in undetected ways, eﬀectively
buying up their own debt.
Roberto Mendoza continued on the issue of mark-to-market accounting.
While recognizing that banks are nowhere near as important to the ﬁnan-
cial system as they used to be, he notes that their application of historical
cost accounting creates enormous distortions from the ﬁrst day the assets
are booked. Banks routinely book assets at cost even when they are worth
signiﬁcantly less than that on the ﬁrst day. Moreover, derivative markets
would allow for quite accurate pricing (individually or in aggregate) of bank
assets. One implication of such cost-based accounting is that banks lend at
too low a rate—as they did in Thailand—and with cheap funding the re-
cipient engages in overly risky behavior. Since the consequences of such
loans will eventually become clear, the single best preventative mechanism
would be to force banks to have fair market value accounting immediately.
Domingo F. Cavallo emphasized the link between capital controls and
capital account inconvertibility. Local ﬁnancial institutions cannot directly
intermediate using foreign exchange when people do not have the right to
convert their money into foreign currencies. This leads to the phenomenon
of capital ﬂight as savers insist on being protected by holding foreign cur-
rency assets. At the same time there is lending from abroad in foreign cur-
rencies. These funds are intermediated through local institutions, with the
lending taking place in domestic currency. This leads to fragile balance
sheets. There would be better quality intermediation if the banks could take
deposits and lend in domestic and foreign currencies.
Larry Summers said that the presence of foreign ﬁnancial institutions in
emerging markets is good on grounds of “diversiﬁcation, risk sharing, and
deep pockets.” One aspect of capital controls that must be considered is the
adverse impact they have on the presence of foreign institutions. Regarding
the distinction between what he called the “macroeconomic-cheat-the-
traditional-trade-oﬀ” and the “prudential” rationales for capital controls,
he said the latter was more compelling. He asked: “If you limit short-term
foreign currency–denominated assets in your banking system, is that a cap-
Financial Policies 151ital control or is it a prudential control?” His answer is that a great deal of
what is defensible is defensible as prudential policy, without making refer-
ence to the notion of capital controls, per se.
Next, drawing an analogy with the policy wisdom that you should elimi-
nate all the energy subsidies before you start putting on energy taxes, Sum-
mers said that inappropriate subsidies and incentives to short-term capital
are an enormous problem. Most of the countries that got overwhelmed
turned out to be those that did a lot of things to keep those ﬂows coming.
Finally, he said that a country’s receptivity to short-term capital is not
something in which those outside the country have a compelling interest.
Thus, it would be a mistake for the international community to seek to try
to impose views like the ones he has just expressed through either trade pol-
icy or the IMF as a broad systematic matter. One substantial exception to
this stance, however, is that it is reasonable to ask countries receiving oﬃ-
cial-sector money to think about removing their barriers to private-sector
money.
Yung Chul Park raised the issue of what exactly is meant by a foreign
bank. He reported that in Korea foreigners own more than 35 percent of the
major commercial banks, but they are all “ﬁnancial investors, not inter-
ested in controlling management.” Foreigners own 70 percent of one bank,
but still are not interested in controlling management. “Is this bank foreign
or is it domestic?” he asked. He noted that the foreign owners are not inter-
ested in sharing their risk management techniques with Koreans, but that
he does not ﬁnd this surprising given that they are competing with domes-
tic banks. On credit risk management, he said that the domestic banks ac-
tually have an advantage given the importance of local knowledge.
Finally, Park pointed out that when ﬁnancial problems developed in Ko-
rea, the foreign banks left even before the investors in Korea. Yet, he said,
we are being constantly reminded that foreigners own practically the entire
banking system in Mexico, and it is still doing well. Martin Feldstein noted
that the issue of the role of foreign ownership is central to the discussion,
and asked Cavallo about the experience of other countries with foreign
banks. Cavallosaid that the entry of foreign banks did give more stability to
the Argentine ﬁnancial system.
Nouriel Roubini expressed ﬁve concerns about foreign banks. First, these
banks might “cherry pick” the best credits, leaving the worst for domestic
institutions. Second, there is evidence that foreign banks are more inclined
to lending in good times but not in bad times than are domestic banks.
Third, although an advantage of foreign banks is supposed to be that they
can rely on their headquarters for support in a crisis, we do not see evidence
of this. Fourth, it may be that home country regulations force the banks op-
erating abroad to retrench more than is desirable. Finally, although it can
be argued that these banks should rely on the home country for any
152 Discussion Summarybailouts, the reality is that there is political pressure for the local authority
to provide the bailout.
Martin Wolf summed up what he had heard in the session as: “postliber-
alization crises are virtually inevitable, even desirable.” Huge changes are
being demanded of developing countries, changes that we know from expe-
rience are typically made because of a crisis. The list of past ﬁnancial crises
in the industrial countries is a long one. Wolf said that what we seem to be
saying to the developing countries is: “We think you ought to reform and
become more like us, and incidentally, along the way, you’re going to have
a few absolutely staggering crises, and the result is that you will have a bet-
ter ﬁnancial system and this is good for you.”
Frederic S. Mishkin sought to make the political economy issues that
Michael Dooley saw as implicit in his paper more explicit. Taking an ex-
ample from Korea, he recalled political pressures to introduce legislation to
allow the conversion of ﬁnance companies into essentially unregulated mer-
chant banking corporations that were owned by the chaebol. These pres-
sures came from the need by chaebol for foreign funds to keep growth out
of their problems (despite a 30 percent national saving rate). The merchant
banks were allowed to borrow short-term. This, he said, is an example of ex-
actly what Summers had talked about—there was encouragement of short-
term foreign borrowing.
Continuing on the political economy theme, Mishkin noted that, from
his conversations with Korean oﬃcials, it is clear they know exactly what
needs to be done. When he asks, “what should you do?” they list exactly the
kinds of things he wrote in his paper. Why doesn’t it happen? Mishkin
stressed that we need to think about the political incentives needed to bring
about these changes. Finally, he returned to the discussion of exchange rate
and monetary regimes from the ﬁrst session, saying that there was no such
thing as a free ﬂoat in a small open economy. If you are going to respond to
the exchange rate, however, he said you are better oﬀ doing it through a
more transparent monetary regime such as inﬂation targeting. Again, this
conclusion is driven by political economy considerations. Good policies
and institutions are “not going to come out of thin air,” he concluded, so po-
litical economy is “implicitly . . . behind a lot of things I talk about in the
paper.”
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